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EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS AND THE
FATE OF CAPITAL PUNISHMENT
JOHN J. DONOHUE∗
ABSTRACT
In his dissenting opinion in Glossip v. Gross, Justice Breyer
attempted to give content to the Supreme Court’s prior command in
Atkins v. Virginia that unless the imposition of the death penalty
“measurably contributes to one or both of [the legitimate penological
goals of deterrence and retribution], it ‘is nothing more than the
purposeless and needless imposition of pain and suffering,’ and hence
an unconstitutional punishment.” Justice Breyer’s opinion illuminates
the central role that empirical studies have played in death penalty
litigation since Furman v. Georgia on issues ranging from the lack of
deterrence associated with the death penalty; to racial and ethnic bias
in its administration; to the extensive delays, cost, errors, and arbitrary
implementation; and to the failure to limit capital punishment to the
worst of the worst offenders.
Two months after Glossip, the battle over the empirical evaluation
of capital punishment played out in the contentious 4-3 decision in State
v. Santiago, in which the Connecticut Supreme Court found the death
penalty unconstitutional in the wake of the state legislature’s prior
prospective abolition. The bitter judicial contention in both Glossip and
Santiago over the evaluation of evidence of racial and ethnic bias and
an array of other empirical issues highlights both the critical
importance of empirical analysis to the fate of the death penalty and
the difficulty that many judges have in properly evaluating statistical
evidence. The statistically unsupportable attempts by the State’s expert
to undermine the overwhelming evidence of racial disparity in capital
charging in Connecticut underscores that highly flawed statistical

Copyright © 2016 John J. Donohue.
∗

C. Wendell and Edith M. Carlsmith Professor of Law, Stanford Law School. The author
wishes to thank Alex Albright, Bhargav Gopal, and Isaac Rabbani for excellent research
assistance and Stanford Law School for research support.

DONAHUE (DO NOT DELETE)

52

9/29/2016 4:04 PM

DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & PUBLIC POLICY

[VOL. 11:1&2

evidence will often be pressed upon (or seized upon by) judges who
may be ideologically inclined to accept work that true experts would
readily reject. If the Supreme Court is able to effectively appraise the
best empirical work in applying the Atkins standard, it is difficult to see
how the death penalty could be sustained as a constitutional
punishment.
Unless the imposition of the death penalty “measurably contributes
to one or both of these goals [deterrence and retribution], it ‘is nothing
more than the purposeless and needless imposition of pain and
suffering,’ and hence an unconstitutional punishment.”
– Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 318–19 (2002) (emphasis added).
INTRODUCTION
The decline of capital punishment in the United States is evident in
the numbers. In 2015, only 49 death sentences were issued in the entire
country (down from a peak of 315 in 1996), and only 28 convicts were
executed (down from a peak of 98 in 1999).1 Not only were these the
lowest numbers in decades, but nineteen states have formally abolished
capital punishment, up from twelve in 2004, and many other states have
not executed anyone for years. Only four states executed more than
one convict in 2015—Texas (13), Georgia (6), Missouri (5), and Florida
(2).2 But even Texas only handed down two death sentences in all of
2015.3
The Supreme Court in Furman v. Georgia4 emphasized that the
infrequency of application of the death penalty with no convincing
basis for distinguishing the few who are sentenced to death from the
many who avoid that penalty rendered capital punishment freakish,
arbitrary, ineffectual, and hence unconstitutional. The reduction in the
use of capital punishment in the last few years invites a similar critique
of the modern capital regime. Even though the U.S. population has
grown by over 50 percent in the last 45 years,5 fewer death sentences
were handed out in the last decade than in the decade preceding the
Furman decision. With this declining use of the death penalty, the

1. Death Penalty Use in 2015 Declines Sharply, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR,
http://deathpenaltyinfo.org/documents/2015YrEnd.pdf (last visited February 10, 2016).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
5. U.S. Population, http://www.worldometers.info/world-population/us-population/ (last
visited June 15, 2016).
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Supreme Court will have to decide whether the trend should be
allowed to play itself out or whether the time is right for a momentous
decision that goes beyond Furman by rendering the death penalty
unconstitutional.
The great eighteenth century Italian criminologist Cesare Beccaria
wrote that the death penalty could not be a legitimate punishment
because it furthers no acceptable penological objective more
effectively than life imprisonment.6 The U.S. Supreme Court has
essentially embraced this Beccarian framework by stating that there
are only two permissible penological objectives of the death penalty—
deterrence and retribution—and, as quoted above, the Court in Atkins
v. Virginia asserted that capital punishment cannot be sustained unless
it “measurably contributes” to one or both of these objectives.7 Whether
the death penalty lives or dies will depend on how courts assess the
growing empirical literature highlighting the lack of benefits associated
with capital punishment and the burgeoning list of problems with its
use.
Two judicial opinions issued during the summer of 2015 previewed
the coming battle over the constitutionality of capital punishment.
Both Justice Breyer’s dissent in Glossip v. Gross,8 and a concurring
opinion from the Connecticut Supreme Court in State v. Santiago9
relied heavily on empirical studies to make the case that the death
penalty could no longer be deemed a constitutionally valid punishment.
At the same time, both cases stimulated harsh attacks on the need for
and proper interpretation of the empirical analysis of the death
penalty.10 These judicial skirmishes illustrate the difficulties that some
judges have had in separating out the wheat from the chaff in
evaluating empirical studies of the death penalty.

6. Cesare Beccaria, On Crimes and Punishment, THE FEDERALIST PAPERS PROJECT 38,
http://thefederalistpapers.integratedmarket.netdna-cdn.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/01/
Cesare-Beccaria-On-Crimes-and-Punishment.pdf (last visited June 13, 2016).
7. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 319 (2002) (emphasis added) (quoting Enmund v.
Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 798 (1982)).
8. Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2755, reh’g denied, 136 S. Ct. 20 (2015) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting).
9. State v. Santiago, 318 Conn. 140, reconsideration denied, 319 Conn. 912 (2015) (Norcott
and McDonald, Js., concurring).
10. See infra text accompanying notes 58, 97, 108; Glossip, 135 S. Ct. at 2748–49 (regarding
Justice Scalia’s criticisms of Breyer’s stance on the empirical literature); infra text accompanying
notes 101, 117; Glossip at 2751–53 (regarding Justice Thomas’ criticisms of the same); see generally
Santiago, 318 Conn. at 231 (Rogers C. J., dissenting); id. at 341–88 (Zarella, J., dissenting); id. at
388–412 (Espinosa, J. dissenting).

DONAHUE (DO NOT DELETE)

54

DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & PUBLIC POLICY

9/29/2016 4:04 PM

[VOL. 11:1&2

It is likely that the fate of the death penalty in the U.S. will depend
on whether the Atkins v. Virginia mandate that capital punishment
must measurably contribute to deterrence or retribution is seriously
and intelligently applied in future court challenges. If it is, the death
penalty could well be deemed unconstitutional—as it was in Santiago11
and as Justice Breyer suggested it should be in Glossip.12 If the
command of Atkins is ignored (or disavowed) or the type of empirical
malpractice that is sometimes offered by the defenders of the death
penalty receives judicial sanction, then the death penalty will live on,
immunized from the mounting evidence of its increasingly troubling
administration.
This paper will address how empirical evidence has and will
continue to shape the debate over the desirability and constitutionality
of the death penalty in the United States at both the state and federal
level. Part I begins with a brief review of some prominent contributions
on the issue of whether capital punishment deters the commission of
murder, and highlights how the National Research Council (NRC)
report of 2012 on deterrence and the death penalty has essentially
foreclosed the argument that the death penalty measurably contributes
to deterrence. The section ends with a detailed description of how
Justice Scalia continued to cite discredited studies on deterrence as
though they had been endorsed rather than specifically rejected by the
NRC report.
Part II addresses the question of whether empirical evidence could
support the position that capital punishment measurably contributes to
retribution. Drawing on work that I prepared in serving as an expert in
a challenge to the Connecticut death penalty, I discuss the finding of
my study that the Connecticut death penalty has not limited death
sentences to the worst of the worst offenses, and respond to criticisms
of my methodology offered by Justices Scalia and Thomas in Glossip.
Looking at how capital punishment has played out over the last four
decades, Justice Breyer noted that over 75 percent of the 183 inmates
sentenced to death throughout the United States in 1978 escaped the
executioner.13 This raises serious doubts about the claim that capital
punishment plausibly furthers a retributive goal. Certainly, one would
not expect such an outcome from a process that rationally separates
out the few who will die from the many who will not.
11. State v. Santiago, 318 Conn. 140, reconsideration denied, 319 Conn. 912 (2015).
12. Glossip, 135 S. Ct. at 2769–70 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
13. Id. at 2768.
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Part III discusses yet another aspect of arbitrariness in capital
outcomes that undermines its retributive goal—the influence of race. I
briefly review the proliferating empirical evidence on race disparities
in capital sentencing, and then discuss the battle between me and
Connecticut’s opposing expert over whether minority on white
murders were capitally charged by Connecticut prosecutors at
significantly higher rates than minority on minority murders.14
Interestingly, the expert witness for Connecticut first acknowledged
this racial disparity in capital charging, then tried to offer at trial a
regression undermining this view based on his mistaken coding of a key
explanatory variable, and subsequently engaged in an array of dubious
efforts to obscure the racial disparity that was clearly evident in the
correct version of the regression that he had presented to the court.
The example underscores the dangers that lurk when judges are
unable to weed out inadequate empirical work, and the discussion
throughout provides an array of illustrations of how judges have
offered invalid statistical evidence, made erroneous factual claims in
the face of valid contradictory evidence, or simply ignored cogent
empirical findings to defend the death penalty. Part IV offers some
concluding remarks on the likely fate of the death penalty if the Atkins
standard is seriously applied in the face of the current empirical
evidence on the administration of capital punishment.

I. DETERRENCE
Cesare Beccaria, writing in 1764 (at age 26!) in his famed treatise
On Crimes and Punishments argued that all aspects of criminal justice,
including whether the death penalty deters crime, needed to “be solved
with that geometrical precision which the mist of sophistry, the
seduction of eloquence, and the timidity of doubt are unable to
resist.”15 For Beccaria, the answer was clear: because life imprisonment
“has in it all that is necessary to deter the most hardened and
determined,” the death penalty could not be a just expression of state
power since the death penalty is not a more effective deterrent than life
imprisonment.16 Indeed, Beccaria feared that capital punishment might
14. “Minority on white murders” are cases where a minority defendant has murdered a
white victim. “White” refers to a non-Hispanic white individual, and “minority” refers to all
others.
15. See Beccaria, supra note 6, at 19.
16. Id. at 39.
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independently decrease deterrence by making citizens callous to the
taking of another’s life with “the example of barbarity it affords.”17
Ultimately, Beccarian thinking has come to influence the belief of
a majority of the Justices of the Supreme Court that, if a death penalty
regime is to be constitutional, it must serve a legitimate penological
interest by advancing the goal of deterrence or retribution.18 Unless the
imposition of the death penalty “measurably contributes to one or both
of these goals [deterrence and retribution], the Supreme Court has
stated, it ‘is nothing more than the purposeless and needless imposition
of pain and suffering,’ and hence an unconstitutional punishment.”19
For our purposes, the operative word in the above quote is
“measurably,” which signals the central role that empirical analysis
must play in assessing the death penalty’s constitutionality under the
Atkins standard. We begin with the first possible justification for using
capital punishment: deterrence. Although Beccaria was confident in his
prediction that the death penalty would not deter—just as some judges
today are confident in their opposing prediction—we no longer need
to rely solely on intuition. Instead, we can statistically evaluate crime
data using modern econometric techniques to see if the Atkins
standard can be satisfied.
A. The Sellin Study Finding No Evidence of Deterrence
The first serious empirical effort to assess the deterrence of the
death penalty was undertaken by the sociologist Thorsten Sellin.20
Based on a careful but simple comparison of the evolution of homicide
rates in contiguous states from 1920 to 1963, Sellin buttressed the
Beccarian doubt that the imposition of the death penalty would
generate any net deterrent effect on murder.21 Sellin’s work may have
been one of the many factors that contributed to the waning reliance
on capital punishment, as executions virtually ceased in the late 1960s.22
17. Id. at 40. Beccaria’s work influenced Jeremy Bentham, who agreed that the death
penalty could not be a just punishment for the reasons that Beccaria articulated. Hugo Adam
Bedau, Bentham’s Utilitarian Critique of the Death Penalty, 74 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1033,
at 1036–37, 1044, 1051 (1983).
18. See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 319 (2002).
19. Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 798 (1982)).
20. Thorsten Sellin, Homicides in Retentionist and Abolitionist States, CAPITAL
PUNISHMENT 135 (Thorsten Sellin ed., 1967).
21. Id. at 138 (finding no evidence that capital punishment deters homicide).
22. See M. Watt Espy & John Ortiz Smykla, Executions in The United States, 1608-2002: The
Espy File (ICPSR 8451), NACJD, http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/icpsrweb/NACJD/studies/8451
(last updated Nov 4, 2005).
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In 1972, the Supreme Court’s decision in Furman ruled that existing
death penalty statutes were unconstitutional.23 Although Furman
appeared to be a setback for supporters of capital punishment, the
decision produced a backlash that stimulated support for the death
penalty, both in state legislatures around the country and in certain
academic circles.24 In 1975, Isaac Ehrlich’s econometric analysis of
national time-series data was used to claim that each execution saved
eight lives.25 A year later, Solicitor General Robert Bork presented a
highly laudatory assessment of Ehrlich’s work (written by his assistant
Frank Easterbrook) to the Supreme Court,26 and the Court, while
claiming not to have relied on the empirical evidence, ended the death
penalty moratorium when it upheld various capital punishment
statutes in Gregg v. Georgia and related cases.27
B. Ehrlich Finds Deterrence But the NRC Disagrees
The Bork-Easterbrook brief highlighted the potential weaknesses
of Sellin’s simple cross-state comparisons, which did not control for
other factors that might have been changing differently in the
treatment and control states (that is, the states adopting the death
penalty and the matched states that did not).28 Because Ehrlich’s
regression study introduced some controls, it seemed at the time to be
an improvement over the Sellin study. Forty years of experience have
now taught us that a poorly designed regression study can easily give
the wrong answer to any causal question, and the complexity of
Ehrlich’s particular approach obscured its abundant flaws to all but the
most sophisticated analysts.
23. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
24. See LEE EPSTEIN & JOSEPH KOBYLKA, THE SUPREME COURT AND LEGAL CHANGE:
ABORTION AND THE DEATH PENALTY 90 (Univ. of N.C. Press 1992) (documenting the rapid
legislative enactment of new state death penalty statutes and increased public support for the
death penalty in the wake of Furman).
25. Isaac Ehrlich, The Deterrent Effect of Capital Punishment: A Matter of Life and Death,
65 AM. ECON. REV., at 398 (1975).
26. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 233–34 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
27. See id. at 185. In Gregg, Justice Stewart stated, “Although some of the studies suggest
that the death penalty may not function as a significantly greater deterrent than lesser penalties,
there is no convincing empirical evidence either supporting or refuting this view.” Id. Yet he then
asserted, “We may nevertheless assume safely that there are murderers, such as those who act in
passion, for whom the threat of death has little or no deterrent effect. But for many others, the
death penalty undoubtedly is a significant deterrent.” Id. Justice Stewart did not clarify whether
he believed that murders would increase if convicted murderers who might otherwise be executed
instead received sentences of life without parole and, if so, on what basis this might be safely
assumed.
28. See Sellin, supra note 20, at 135.
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The injection of Ehrlich’s conclusions into the legal and public
policy arenas, coupled with the academic debate over Ehrlich’s
methods, led the National Academy of Sciences to convene a panel of
experts that issued a 1978 report concluding that Ehrlich’s work in
support of a deterrent effect of capital punishment was unpersuasive.29
Over the next two decades, as a series of conflicting academic papers
were published on the deterrence question, the rate of executions
gradually increased, albeit to levels much lower than those seen in the
first half of the twentieth century.30 While some improvidently claimed
that there was strong evidence that the death penalty deterred
murder,31 the growing recognition of the dramatic weaknesses of the
pro-deterrence literature led to the release of a second National
Academy of Sciences panel report in 2012 entitled “DETERRENCE AND
THE DEATH PENALTY,”32 which again found no valid statistical support
for the claim of deterrence.
It is now widely accepted among top-flight empirical scholars that
not a single study credibly supports the view that capital punishment as
administered anywhere in the United States provides any added
deterrent beyond that afforded by a sentence of life imprisonment.33
The indictment by the NRC report of the studies claiming to find a
deterrent effect of capital punishment applied both to studies that
examined the death penalty throughout the United States, as well as

29. NAT’L ACAD. OF SCIS, DETERRENCE AND INCAPACITATION: ESTIMATING THE
EFFECTS OF CRIMINAL SANCTIONS ON CRIME RATES, 59–62 (Alfred Blumstein et al. eds., 1978).
While the validity of Sellin’s study depended on how well he selected matching states that did and
did not use the death penalty, at least he was looking at plausibly meaningful data. Ehrlich’s initial
study was focused on national time series data, which was inherently defective since it had no way
to link changes in executions to homicides in the relevant states. See John J. Donohue, Empirical
Evaluation of Law: The Dream and the Nightmare, 17 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 313, 311–20 (2015).
30. See Espy & Smykla, supra note 22.
31. See discussion infra accompanying note 40.
32. COMM. ON DETERRENCE AND THE DEATH PENALTY, COMM. ON LAW AND JUSTICE,
DIV. OF BEHAVIORAL AND SOC. SCIS AND EDUC., NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, DETERRENCE
AND THE DEATH PENALTY 3 (Daniel S. Nagin & John V. Peppers eds., 2012) [hereinafter COMM.
ON DETERRENCE AND THE DEATH PENALTY]. The NRC panel included an array of impressive
scholars with differing political beliefs, who reached a unanimous conclusion regardless of their
prior position on the death penalty. In particular, James Q. Wilson, the former Ronald Reagan
Professor of Public Policy at the Pepperdine University School of Public Policy, who had
previously written in support of the death penalty, joined the final report’s conclusion that no
existing study credibly supported the deterrent effect of the death penalty.
The particular value of reports emanating from the NAS has been specifically acknowledged in
the federal judiciary: “As the National Academy of Sciences was recognized by experts for both
parties as the ‘most prestigious’ scientific association in this country, we will accordingly cite to its
opinion where appropriate.” Kitzmiller v. Dover Area Sch. Dist., 400 F. Supp. 2d 707, 735 (2005).
33. See generally Donohue, supra note 29, at 313.
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studies that limited their focus to individual states. Specifically, the
report noted that whether one looked at Texas, which vigorously
applied the death penalty in the 1990s and 2000s; California, a state that
sentenced many convicts to death but which has only executed 13 over
the last 30 years; or New York, which has executed no one over this
period; the murder rates have moved roughly comparably. In fact, while
all three states had roughly similar murder rates in the early 1990s, the
only one of the three not to execute anyone–New York–has enjoyed a
substantially lower murder rate since the time that Texas executions
rose sharply in the late 1990s.34
C. Justice Scalia Clings to the Deterrence Argument Despite the NRC
Report
But as educated judgment was taking a dim view of the studies
purporting to show a deterrent effect of the death penalty, some judges
were having a difficult time sorting out the wheat from the chaff. In the
face of the unanimous judgment of the NRC panel that Justice Breyer
cited in support of his view that the death penalty is not likely to be a
greater deterrent than life imprisonment, Justice Scalia disagreed,
saying, “[i]t seems very likely to me, and there are statistical studies that
say so.”35 This disagreement mimicked a previous exchange between
Justices Scalia and Stevens in the case of Baze v. Rees,36 in which Justice
Stevens cited research by Donohue and Wolfers and others to justify
the claim that “there remains no reliable statistical evidence that
capital punishment in fact deters potential offenders.”37 Justice Scalia
replied by saying that Justice Stevens’ conclusions “are not supported
by the available data.”38 Justice Scalia supported his assertion with a
cite to a single article by Cass Sunstein and Adrian Vermeule that was
not an empirical evaluation of the deterrent effect of the death penalty
(although it did list some such articles), but rather a philosophical
discussion of what would be appropriate policy if the death penalty

34. See Figure 3-3 in COMM. ON DETERRENCE AND THE DEATH PENALTY, supra note 32.
Similar evidence of the lack of deterrence from the operation of the death penalty based on
studies from around the world is summarized in ROGER HOOD & CAROLYN HOYLE, THE DEATH
PENALTY: A WORLDWIDE PERSPECTIVE 423–25 (5th ed. 2015).
35. Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2746, reh’g denied, 136 S. Ct. 20 (2015) (Scalia, J.,
concurring).
36. Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35 (2008).
37. Id. at 79 (Stevens, J., concurring). See also John J. Donohue & Justin Wolfers, Uses and
Abuses of Empirical Evidence in the Death Penalty Debate, 58 STAN. L. REV. 791 (2005)
[hereinafter Uses and Abuses].
38. Id. at 89 (Scalia, J., concurring).
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were a deterrent.39 Sunstein soon responded to Justice Scalia’s claims
by stating directly in a piece with Justin Wolfers that “[i]n short, the
best reading of the accumulated data is that they do not establish a
deterrent effect of the death penalty.”40 Apparently, neither the
Sunstein and Wolfers correction of Justice Scalia, my own published
discussion of this correction of the Justice,41 nor the 2012 release of the
NRC report42 moved Justice Scalia to reconsider his reliance on the
Sunstein and Vermeule article because this was one of the three
“statistical studies” that Justice Scalia again offered to rebut Justice
Breyer’s claim in Glossip.43
The two additional studies that Justice Scalia provided in Glossip
to support his intuition that the death penalty is a deterrent44—one by
Zimmerman45 and one by Dezhbakhsh, Rubin, & Shepherd
(“DRS”)46—were specifically identified in the NRC report as studies
that should “not be used to inform” discussion about the deterrent
value of the death penalty.47 Indeed, if one merely types these four
names into Google, it brings up Donohue and Wolfers, “Uses and
Abuses of Empirical Evidence in the Death Penalty Debate,”48 which,
along with the NRC report,49 and another Donohue and Wolfers’
article,50 catalogs a large array of problems with the Zimmerman and
DRS studies.51
Perhaps the simplest of these problems to articulate is that both the
DRS and Zimmerman results were not statistically significant.52
39. Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, Is Capital Punishment Morally Required? Acts,
Omissions, and Life-Life Tradeoffs, 58 STAN. L. REV. 703, 706 (2005).
40. Cass R. Sunstein & Justin Wolfers, A Death Penalty Puzzle, THE WASH. POST (Jun. 30,
2008) (emphasis added), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/06/29/AR
2008062901476.html.
41. See Donohue, supra note 29, at 37.
42. COMM. ON DETERRENCE AND THE DEATH PENALTY, supra note 32, at 102.
43. Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2748–49, reh’g denied, 136 S. Ct. 20 (2015) (Scalia, J.,
concurring).
44. Id.
45. Paul R. Zimmerman, State Executions, Deterrence, and the Incidence of Murder, 7 J.
APPLIED ECON. 163 (2004).
46. Hashem Dezhbakhsh et al., Does Capital Punishment Have a Deterrent Effect? New
Evidence from Postmoratorium Panel Data, 5 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 344 (2003).
47. COMM. ON DETERRENCE AND THE DEATH PENALTY, supra note 33, at 102.
48. See Donahue & Wolfers, Uses and Abuses, supra note 38, at 836–39.
49. COMM. ON DETERRENCE AND THE DEATH PENALTY, supra note 33.
50. John J. Donohue & Justin Wolfers, Estimating the Impact of the Death Penalty on
Murder, 11 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 249 (2009) [hereinafter Impact of Death Penalty].
https://www.google.com/search?q=Zimmerman+Dezhbakhsh+Rubin+
51. GOOGLE,
Shepherd (last visited Apr. 4, 2016).
52. See Donohue & Wolfers, Impact of Death Penalty, supra note 50, at 30–31. This wasn’t
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Moreover, the failure of both the DRS and Zimmerman studies to
properly implement an econometric technique called “instrumental
variables” led them to be specifically rejected by the NRC report
because their instruments—and hence their findings—were not
credible: “In general, the committee finds that the instruments
proposed in the research are not credible and, as a result, this
identification strategy has thus far failed to overcome the challenges to
identifying a causal effect of the death penalty on homicide rates.”53
While Justice Scalia remained untroubled by or oblivious to the
issues raised in the NRC report, his recidivist pronouncements in
Glossip after his missteps in Baze v. Rees are somewhat troubling.54 In
the wake of the clear discrediting by a unanimous panel of the National
Research Council of the two actual statistical studies that Justice Scalia
relied on and the subsequent specific rejection of Justice Scalia’s
conclusion by the lead author of a study he cited,55 one might have
hoped that Justice Scalia would offer something more credible than an
effectively unadorned claim of what “seem[ed] very likely”56 to him as
a basis for ignoring a strong expert consensus.
Although it is undoubtedly challenging for a judge to
independently sort out the good from the bad statistical studies, all
Justice Scalia needed to do was read the abstract of the NRC report,
which Justice Breyer cited,57 to know he was treading on thin ice in
the fault of the authors since, at the time they published, the correct approach for adjusting one’s
standard errors by clustering had not been identified. Intuitively, the problem is that without
clustering, the calculation of statistical significance assumes, incorrectly, that the observation for
say, murder in Illinois in 2000 is independent of the levels of murders in Illinois a year later. In
fact, these two observations are highly correlated so there is less independent information
available to the researcher than appears. Clustering adjusts for this fact, which will reduce
statistical significance. This effect was strong enough to undermine the DRS and Zimmerman
findings.
The need for clustering only became widely known in 2004 with the publication of Marianne
Bertrand et al., How Much Should We Trust Differences-In-Differences Estimates? 119 Q. J.
ECON., at 249 (2004). Aneja, Donohue, and Zhang clearly establish that the standard errors in the
panel data crime studies that Justice Scalia cites are way too small, thereby exaggerating estimates
of statistical significance. See Abhay Aneja et al., The Impact of Right-to-Carry Laws and the NRC
Report: Lessons for the Empirical Evaluation of Law and Policy, 13 AM. L. ECON. REV., at 565
(2011); Abhay Aneja et al., The Impact of Right to Carry Laws and the NRC Report: The Latest
Lessons for the Empirical Evaluation of Law and Policy, NBER WORKING PAPER NO. 18294
(2012).
53. COMM. ON DETERRENCE AND THE DEATH PENALTY, supra note 32, at 68.
54. Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2746, reh’g denied, 136 S. Ct. 20 (2015) (Scalia, J.,
concurring); Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 87 (2008) (Scalia, J., concurring).
55. See Sunstein & Wolfers, supra note 40.
56. Glossip, 135 S. Ct. at 2748 (Scalia, J., concurring).
57. Id. at 2768 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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offering two discredited statistical studies. It is also not asking too much
to expect a judge to at least acknowledge when the primary author of
the article he is citing for a certain proposition has specifically
disavowed that proposition. Citations to empirical studies are not
supposed to be mere props to create an illusion of support for a judge’s
untutored intuitions.
Having parried with his junk science, Justice Scalia then thrusted at
Justice Breyer with the charge that, because federal judges are shielded
from violence that plagues other members of the community, Justice
Breyer’s views on the death penalty reflect a “let-them-eat-cake
obliviousness to the needs of others.”58 But, because Justice Breyer was
being attentive to the best studies on the issue of deterrence while
Scalia was not, the charge of “obliviousness” seems misdirected.
Moreover, a majority of murder victims in the United States are black,
59
so attentiveness to the needs of others might lead one to inquire
about the attitude towards the death penalty of members of this racial
group. In fact, most blacks oppose the death penalty, perhaps reflecting
their realization that it both will not promote their safety and is
administered in a discriminatory fashion.60
Scalia’s pronouncements concerning deterrence and the death
penalty seem to buttress Judge Richard Posner’s claim that Justice
Scalia has a tendency to engage in “‘motivated thinking,’ the form of
cognitive delusion that consists of credulously accepting the evidence
that supports a preconception and of peremptorily rejecting the
evidence that contradicts it.”61 Similarly, another academic critic (and
former law clerk) has charged that Justice Scalia has an anti-scientific
mindset that essentially believes that the quality of empirical studies is
governed not by the dictates of scientific methodology but rather by
how closely their findings conform to one’s previously held beliefs.62
58. Id. at 2749 (Scalia, J., concurring).
59. Uniform Crime Reports: Expanded Homicide Data Table 1, FED. BUREAU OF
INVESTIGATION,
https://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/crime-in-the-u.s/2014/crime-in-the-u.s.2014/tables/expanded-homicide-data/expanded_homicide_data_table_1_murder_victims_
by_race_ethnicity_and_sex_2014.xls (last visited June 13, 2016).
60. “A majority of African Americans (55%) oppose the death penalty . . . .” Gallup Poll:
Support for Death Penalty Declines 2%, Opposition Reaches Highest Level in 43 Years, DEATH
PENALTY INFO. CTR, http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/node/6275 (last visited June 14, 2016).
61. Richard Posner, The Incoherence of Antonin Scalia, THE NEW REPUBLIC Aug. 23, 2012,
https://newrepublic.com/article/106441/scalia-garner-reading-the-law-textual-originalism.
62. As Harvard law professor Bruce Hay, Scalia’s former law clerk, recently wrote,
“Antonin Scalia generally detested science. It threatened everything he believed in. . . . Scientists
should be listened to only if they supported conservative causes, for example dubious
studies purporting to demonstrate that same-sex parenting is harmful to children.” Bruce Hay, I
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This is an unappealing and dangerous judicial trait—particularly in a
matter of life and death—but unfortunately one that other strong
judicial supporters of the death penalty seem to share.63
The bottom line is that decades of research examining the impact
of capital punishment on the rate of murder have been unable to satisfy
the constitutional standard quoted above from Atkins v. Virginia that
capital punishment “measurably contribute” to the legitimate
penological goal of deterrence. If the Atkins command is to be retained
and given effect, the only basis on which a death penalty could be
sustained would be on the grounds that it “measurably contributes” to
retribution.
II. RETRIBUTION
The most unrelenting invocation of retribution as the rationale for
the death penalty came from Immanuel Kant, who stated:
[W]hoever has committed Murder, must die. There is, in this case, no
juridical substitute or surrogate that can be given or taken for the
satisfaction of Justice. There is no Likeness or proportion between
Life, however painful, and Death; and therefore there is no Equality
between the crime of Murder and the retaliation of it but what is
judicially accomplished by the execution of the Criminal.64

Ironically, Justice Scalia tried to counter Justice Breyer’s contention
in Glossip that the death penalty was unconstitutional by noting that
Kant “believe[d] that death is the only just punishment for taking a
life.”
The irony is two-fold. First, Scalia famously stated, “[W]e don’t
have the same moral and legal framework as the rest of the world, and

Thought I Could Reason With Antonin Scalia: A More Naive Young Fool Never Drew Breath,
(Feb.
27,
2016),
http://www.salon.com/2016/02/27/i_thought_i_could_reason
SALON
_with_antonin_scalia_a_more_naive_young_fool_never_drew_breath/
63. See infra text accompanying notes 101–107, 113–125 (discussing Justice Thomas’ use of
empirical evidence) and text accompanying notes 190, 198 (discussing the trial court decisions in
McCleskey v. Kemp and in In Re. Death Penalty Disparity Claims, Connecticut Superior Court,
October 11, 2013).
64. IMMANUEL KANT, THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW: AN EXPOSITION OF THE FUNDAMENTAL
PRINCIPLES OF JURISPRUDENCE AS THE SCIENCE OF RIGHT 125 (W. Hastie trans., Clark 1887)
(emphasis in original). One hesitates to be sharply critical of a philosopher such as Kant, who
made a number of important contributions to moral theory, but any fundamentalist notion that
there must be “equality” between crime and punishment is so nonsensical that it needs to be
aggressively dismissed. We do not rape rapists, nor do we torture torturers. Thankfully, any such
inclination to punish in this fashion would be quickly, and appropriately, dismissed on Eighth
Amendment grounds.
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never have. If you told the framers of the Constitution that [what] we’re
after is to . . . do something that will be just like Europe, they would
have been appalled.”65 Justice Scalia failed to explain his rationale for
why European legal concepts would be irrelevant to American
constitutional law when Kant’s views on the death penalty would merit
citation in a constitutional case.66
Second, and perhaps more importantly for our purposes, Scalia’s
statement provides an opportunity to highlight how even the most
basic descriptive statistics can illustrate the weakness of theoretical
arguments. Rather than buttressing the modern death penalty, the
reference to Kant only shows how orthogonal the thinking of that
eighteenth century German philosopher is to the current legal debate
in America. If the only punishment for taking a life were execution—
the Kantian prescription—the state would have to kill over 14,000
individuals every year.67 This is not only unconstitutional (the Supreme
Court emphatically ruled in Woodson v. North Carolina that any such
mandatory application of the death penalty for murders would be
constitutionally barred68), but more importantly the American people
would never stand for such levels of state-sponsored killing. In the
modern era of capital punishment (since Furman), the U.S. has never
executed more than 98 (in 1999) in a single year and only executed 28
in 2015.69 This empirical evidence on the relative infrequency of
executions in the U.S. compared to what would occur under Kantian
principles of appropriate punishment for murderers underscores how
Kant’s thinking on this issue could scarcely be less informative on any
question about the modern death penalty.
In the decidedly non-Kantian world of the U.S. death penalty when
the death penalty must be reserved for the worst of the worst

65. American University, Transcript of Debate Between Justices Scalia and Breyer on
Foreign Law, FREE REPUBLIC, (Jan. 13, 2005), http://www.freerepublic.com/focus
/news/1352357/posts.
66. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U. S. 551, 624–28 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that
“foreign sources” should “be rejected out of hand”).
67. “In 2014, the estimated number of murders in the nation was 14,249.” Uniform Crime
Reports: 2014 Crime in the United States, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION,
https://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/crime-in-the-u.s/2014/crime-in-the-u.s.-2014/offensesknown-to-law-enforcement/murder.
68. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280–81 (1976).
69. See
Searchable
Execution
Database,
DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR.,
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/views-executions?exec_name_1=&exec_year%5B
%5D=2015&sex=All&sex_1=All&federal=All&foreigner=All&juvenile=All&volunteer=All
(last visited Apr. 6, 2016).
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offenders,70 the use of the death penalty can only measurably
contribute to retribution if those who are the most egregious or
culpable offenders—the most deserving of death—are executed, and
those who commit less egregious crimes, who are less deserving of
death, will be spared. Of course, any retributive goal would be
undermined if an excessive number of innocent individuals were
executed, and Justice Breyer’s Glossip dissent discusses the uneasy
facts concerning errors in capital convictions.71
Killing innocent individuals, though, is not the only problem that
can undermine the retributive goal of a capital regime. A number of
factors subject to empirical investigation can also give content to the
Supreme Court edict that a death penalty regime must provide a
“meaningful basis for distinguishing the few cases in which [death] is
imposed from the many cases in which it is not.”72 A capital regime
could fail to measurably contribute to retribution if it did not limit the
death penalty to the worst of the worst offenders, or if it was marred by
racial or ethnic bias, or a reliance on any morally arbitrary categories
in deciding who would be sentenced to death. Justice Breyer addressed
all of these issues as he raised concerns about whether retribution could
provide a constitutionally valid basis to uphold capital punishment.73 In
Section III, we address the empirical literature on racial disparity. Now,
we turn to the empirical evidence on whether capital punishment has
been administered in a way that meaningfully furthers a rational
retributive goal by limiting the death penalty to the worst of the worst
offenders.
A. Limiting the Death Penalty to the Worst of the Worst
The Supreme Court has stated that “[c]apital punishment must be
limited to those offenders who commit ‘a narrow category of the most

70. As Justice Breyer states in his Glossip dissent, “The Court has . . . sought to make the
application of the death penalty less arbitrary by restricting its use to those whom Justice Souter
called ‘the worst of the worst.’” Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2760, reh’g denied, 136 S. Ct. 20
(2015) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (quoting Kansas v. Marsh, 548 U.S. 163, 206 (2006) (Souter, J.,
dissenting)).
71. Some “retributivists, while not opposed philosophically to capital punishment, oppose
it because of increasing evidence (particularly in light of the DNA revolution) that innocent
persons have been sentenced to death,” Lawrence C. Marshall, The Innocence Revolution in the
Death Penalty, 1 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 573 (2004), or “because of proven racial discrimination in
sentencing.” JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 54–55 n.12. (7th ed.
LexisNexis 2015).).
72. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 313 (1972) (White, J., concurring).
73. Glossip, 135 S. Ct. at 2755 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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serious crimes’ and whose extreme culpability makes them ‘the most
deserving of execution.’”74 As Justice Breyer noted in Glossip, “The
Court has . . . sought to make the application of the death penalty less
arbitrary by restricting its use to those whom Justice Souter called “the
worst of the worst.’”75
1. Evaluating Egregiousness of Crimes – Establishing Validity
During litigation challenging the constitutionality of the
Connecticut death penalty, I explored whether the Connecticut death
penalty system was operating consistently with this command by
analyzing the treatment of the 205 death-eligible cases in Connecticut
between 1973 and 2007 to see if the nine that ended up with a sustained
death sentence conformed to this narrowing requirement.76
Specifically, I adhered to a well-developed literature in which coders
were given summaries of fact patterns and asked to rate them along a
category scale. Thorsten Sellin and Marvin Wolfgang initiated this
literature in 1964 when they used judges, police officers, and college
students to rate criminal acts.77 They found that the respondents were
easily able to handle the rating tasks and that there was “considerable
agreement among subgroups about both the relative ordering of
criminal acts and the scale scores given.”78
A decade later, these findings were replicated in “a more
representative population” by Peter H. Rossi, Emily Waite, Christine E.
Bose, and Richard E. Berk, who also noted that “the more highly
educated and the younger respondents were, the more likely were their
individual ratings of criminal acts to agree with the average computed
for the entire sample.”79 Rossi et al. concluded that “the norms defining
how serious various criminal acts are considered to be, are quite widely
distributed among blacks and whites, males and females, high and low
socioeconomic levels, and among levels of educational attainment.”80

74. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 568 (2005) (quoting Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304,
319 (2002)).
75. Kansas v. Marsh, 548 U.S. at 163 (2006) (Souter, J., dissenting).
76. John J. Donohue III, An Empirical Evaluation of the Connecticut Death Penalty System
Since 1973: Are There Unlawful Racial, Gender, and Geographic Disparities?, 11 J. OF EMPIRICAL
LEGAL STUD. 637–96 (2014) [hereinafter An Empirical Evaluation].
77. THORSTEN SELLIN & MARVIN E. WOLFGANG, THE MEASUREMENT OF DELINQUENCY
248–49 (Wiley 1964).
78. Id.
79. Peter H. Rossi, Emily Waite, Christine Bose, and Richard Berk, The Seriousness of
Crimes: Normative Structure and Individual Differences, AM. SOC. REV., 2 Vol. 39, 224–37 (1974).
80. Id.
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In 1998, Nobel laureate Daniel Kahneman, David Schkade, and
Cass Sunstein used a similar methodology to create a measure of
outrageous misconduct that might warrant an award of punitive
damages.81 The authors asked coders to rate the outrageousness and
punishment-worthiness of ten different personal injury fact patterns on
a scale from 0 to 6 on two measures. On the outrage scale, 0 denoted
“completely acceptable” behavior and 6 denoted “absolutely
outrageous” behavior.82 On the punishment scale, 0 denoted “no
punishment” as the appropriate level and 6 denoted “extremely severe
punishment.”83 They too found that there was substantial consensus on
judgments of the outrageousness of defendant conduct and the
appropriate severity of punishment the defendant should receive.84
2. Measuring Egregiousness of Connecticut Murders
Following this well-established research tradition, I developed two
similar measures of egregiousness for each of the 205 death-eligible
cases in my dataset.85 For the first measure of egregiousness, which I
call the “Composite Egregiousness Score,” I designed a scale based on
the following four factors drawn from the relevant Connecticut capital
felony statute and judicial decisions and asked coders to rate the
egregiousness of each case for each of the factors on a scale from 1 to
3, with 3 being high:
1. Victim Suffering, considering 1) the intensity of suffering, as
measured by the degree of physical pain and/or mental anguish,
and 2) the duration of suffering;
2. Victim Characteristics, considering 1) whether the victim was a
law enforcement officer and 2) the vulnerability of the victim
relative to the defendant, signaled by factors such as the victim’s
age, any mental or physical disability from which the victim
suffered, whether the victim was outnumbered by assailants,
whether the defendant held a position of authority over the
victim, and whether the victim was intoxicated or high;

81. Daniel Kahneman, David Schkade & Cass R. Sunstein, Shared Outrage and Erratic
Awards: The Psychology of Punitive Damages, 16 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 49 (1998). Four years
after this work was published, Kahneman, a psychologist by training and Princeton professor, won
the 2002 Nobel Prize in Economics.
82. Id. at 57.
83. Id.
84. Id. Interestingly, Kahneman, Schkade, and Sunstein found that while there was widely
shared agreement about the outrageousness of the studied conduct, the resulting assessment of
punitive damages on a monetary scale did not reflect this underlying outrageousness.
85. See Donohue, An Empirical Evaluation, supra note 76, at 11.
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3. Defendant Intent/Culpability, considering a range of factors
including 1) the defendant’s motive for committing the murder, 2)
whether the death of the victim was planned, 3) whether the
defendant acted rashly or in the heat of the moment, and 4)
whether the defendant’s judgment was compromised by, for
example, psychiatric problems, drugs, or intoxication;
4. Number of Victims. I asked coders to indicate the number of
deaths caused by the defendant, truncated at a maximum value of
3.86

I then summed the scores for each of the four component factors,
so that the Composite Egregiousness score for a given case could range
from 4 to 12 (henceforth referred to as the “4–12 Composite
Egregiousness Scale”).87
Second, I asked coders (eighteen law students from Yale and the
University of Connecticut) to rate the overall egregiousness of each
case on a scale from one to five, with five being high.88 The purpose of
this second scale was to capture more general reactions to each case
and to compensate for any over- or under-inclusiveness of the 4–12
Composite Egregiousness Scale. For example, the murders of law
enforcement officers may tend to receive lower scores on the
Composite scale because each of these cases involved only one victim
and these crimes rarely involved prolonged or brutal victim suffering.89
If there is a widespread belief that murders of police officers are
particularly egregious, notwithstanding the typically low number of
victims and relatively low degree of victim suffering, then the Overall
Egregiousness scale might better capture the egregiousness of such
crimes.90 This one to five overall egregiousness measure is exactly
analogous to the scales used in the work by Kahneman et al and the
prior literature assessing the heinousness of crimes.91
Critically, coders rated cases on the basis of fact summaries that
were scrubbed of any reference to (1) the race of the victim and
defendant, and (2) how the defendant was charged and sentenced.92

86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. One reflection of the similarity between these two egregiousness measures is that the
correlation of the average 4–12 egregiousness score and the average 1–5 egregiousness score
(across our 18 coders) was .88.
91. Kahneman et al., supra note 81, at 5.
92. Id.
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The goal was to include in the summaries sufficient information for
coders to make judgments about the egregiousness of each case, but to
exclude information that might bias their judgments. Each case
summary included the basic facts of the case, as well as any relevant
information about the defendant that might bear upon the defendant’s
intent or mental state, such as expert or court findings of mental illness.
One of the advantages of the egregiousness coding exercise was
that I was able to average the egregiousness assessments for individual
cases across eighteen different coders.93 Averaging across such a large
number of coders who have all coded all 205 cases guarantees (1) a
greater uniformity of evaluation than would be present if only a subset
of cases were scored by the various coders, and (2) increased precision
in the egregiousness scores in that the idiosyncratic views of individual
coders would tend to cancel out. Of course, the meaningfulness of these
results depends on how reliable these coding evaluations are in
capturing the underlying egregiousness of the various crimes. It turns
out that the egregiousness scores are highly reliable across the eighteen
coders, as determined by the high degree of inter-coder agreement.
Moreover, if one simply takes the correlation between the average
egregiousness scores across our seven Yale coders versus the eleven
University of Connecticut coders, it is extremely high: .91 for the 4-12
Composite egregiousness measure and .85 for the 1-5 Overall
egregiousness measure.94
It is important to note that the data from the egregiousness scales
reflect each coder’s views on the relative egregiousness of offenses. I
did not ask coders what punishment they thought was appropriate for
each offender. Thus, even a coder who believed that no offender should
ever be sentenced to death, or that all murderers should be sentenced
to death, would be able to rate the egregiousness of the cases in relation
to each other. By having each coder score every case, I sought to
determine whether the most egregious cases—the “worst of the
worst”—were the ones in which the death penalty was imposed.
Whether the coders’ general preferences for harsh or lenient
punishment varied from that of the general population in Connecticut
is largely irrelevant to this study, because only the relative
egregiousness of different cases matters. There is no reason why the
93. The egregiousness scores were calculated by averaging or otherwise amalgamating
scores from eighteen coders—seven Yale Law students and 11 University of Connecticut law
students.
94. Author’s calculation.

DONAHUE (DO NOT DELETE)

70

DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & PUBLIC POLICY

9/29/2016 4:04 PM

[VOL. 11:1&2

relative scoring of cases should depend on coders’ overall political or
sentencing preferences. Both liberals and conservatives would agree,
for example, that killing three is worse than killing one, or that torture
resulting in death is worse than a death caused when a stray bullet fired
in the course of a robbery kills one of the other robbers.
3. Were the Nine Sustained Death Sentences in Connecticut the
Worst Crimes?
The New York Times prepared a graphic capturing the results under
the Comprehensive 4-12 Egregiousness measure, which is reprinted as
Figure 1 below.95 Each box in the figure represents one of the 205 deatheligible cases in Connecticut, and the associated egregiousness measure
is shown along the horizontal axis. In the Kantian world, where all must
die, every box would be shaded reflecting universal execution. If the
death penalty were being reserved for the worst of the worst offenses
within the category of death-eligible crimes, then we would expect to
see the shaded boxes in the right tail of the distribution. In fact, only
one case fell in that region, with the rest spread fairly widely across the
full universe of cases.

95. Lincoln Caplan, The Random Horror of the Death Penalty, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 7, 2012),
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/08/opinion/sunday/the-random-horror-of-the-deathpenalty.html.
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Figure 1

In making the argument that the death penalty in Connecticut had
not been limited to those within the class of death-eligible cases that
were the worst of the worst, Justice Breyer summarized the result of
my study as follows:
Application of the studies’ metrics made clear that only 1 of those 9
defendants was indeed the “worst of the worst” (or was, at least,
within the 15% considered most “egregious”). The remaining eight
were not. Their behavior was no worse than the behavior of at least
33 and as many as 170 other defendants (out of a total pool of 205)
who had not been sentenced to death.
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Such studies indicate that the factors that most clearly ought to
affect application of the death penalty—namely, comparative
egregiousness of the crime—often do not. Other studies show that
circumstances that ought not to affect application of the death
penalty, such as race, gender, or geography, often do.96

B. The Attacks by Justices Scalia and Thomas on the Connecticut
Death Penalty Study
Justice Scalia mocked Justice Breyer’s citation of my Connecticut
death penalty study with a derisive reference to any “system of
metrics,” stating:
Egregiousness is a moral judgment susceptible of few hard-and-fast
rules. More importantly, egregiousness of the crime is only one of
several factors that render a punishment condign—culpability,
rehabilitative potential, and the need for deterrence also are
relevant.97

But Justice Scalia’s naked incantation that three additional factors
are relevant to capital sentencing collapses upon reflection. We have
already discussed that the findings of the National Research Council
report essentially take deterrence off the table as a justification for the
death penalty under the Atkins’ standard because there is simply no
measurable contribution to be found.98 Moreover, for capital crimes in
Connecticut, the only possible sentences are death and life without
possibility of parole;99 thus, “rehabilitative potential” is not a major
concern. Finally, “culpability” is undoubtedly a key element of
egregiousness and indeed was the third factor in my Comprehensive 412 egregiousness factor and clearly of central importance in any
egregiousness measure.100 In other words, Justice Scalia has not
identified any relevant factor that is not fully considered in my
egregiousness measures.
Perhaps the opinion of Justice Thomas better expresses Justice
Scalia’s concern:
The Donohue study, on which JUSTICE BREYER relies most
heavily, measured the “egregiousness” (or “deathworthiness”) of
murders by asking lawyers to identify the legal grounds for

96.
97.
98.
99.
100.

Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2760 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
Glossip, 135 S. Ct. at 2748 (Scalia, J., concurring).
COMM. ON DETERRENCE AND THE DEATH PENALTY, supra note 33, at 2.
CONN. GEN. STAT., § 53a-46a (g) (2005).
Donohue, An Empirical Evaluation, supra note 76, at 65.
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aggravation in each case, and by asking law students to evaluate
written summaries of the murders and assign “egregiousness” scores
based on a rubric designed to capture and standardize their moral
judgments. Donohue, An Empirical Evaluation of the Connecticut
Death Penalty System Since 1973, Are There Unlawful Racial,
Gender, and Geographic Disparities? 11 J. of Empirical Legal
Studies 637, 644–645 (2014). This exercise in some ways
approximates the function performed by jurors, but there is at least
one critical difference: The law students make their moral
judgments based on written summaries—they do not sit through
hours, days, or weeks of evidence detailing the crime; they do not
have an opportunity to assess the credibility of witnesses, to see the
remorse of the defendant, to feel the impact of the crime on the
victim’s family; they do not bear the burden of deciding the fate of
another human being; and they are not drawn from the community
whose sense of security and justice may have been torn asunder by
an act of callous disregard for human life. They are like appellate
judges and justices, reviewing only a paper record of each side’s case
for life or death.101

Justice Thomas’ recitation of obvious differences between the
judgments of capital jurors and my coders fails to appreciate the
demands of a social scientific study. I needed to evaluate all 205 deatheligible cases in Connecticut, not just the 28 that went to a jury for a
capital sentencing determination. Furthermore, I needed every one of
my coders to evaluate all cases (unlike the single one that a capital jury
would see) and to be screened from morally-irrelevant information
about race and ethnicity (which of course the jury would observe and
be influenced by). I discuss these issues below.
1. The Need to Consider All 205 Death-Eligible Cases
We can interpret Justice Thomas’ concerns in light of the reasons
that the Connecticut death penalty study was undertaken. First, the
study was trying to find out whether arbitrary factors (such as race and
geography) were influencing capital outcomes and also whether the
death penalty was being limited to the worst of the worst offenders.
Knowing that a jury has rendered a death penalty verdict in the sole
case in which it was empaneled reveals that twelve individuals have had
an extended opportunity to consider some or all of the factors that
Justice Thomas suggests. But such information tells us virtually nothing
about the issues the Connecticut death penalty study was asked to
101. Glossip, 135 S. Ct. at 2751 (Thomas, J., concurring).
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address. One needs some methodology for determining, for example,
whether a jury was critically swayed by the race of the defendant or
victim in making the judgment to execute a defendant. Furthermore,
even if every capital jury acted perfectly in deciding who deserves to
die, the question analyzed in the Connecticut death penalty study
would not yet be answered. One also needs to know whether
impermissible factors influence which cases even make it to capital
sentencing hearing. In the most obvious illustration of this point, if
prosecutors were only to bring to capital juries cases in which
minorities killed whites, the capital regime would be fatally defective
no matter how exquisite capital juries were in rendering their final
sentence.
Thomas asserts, “[r]elying on these studies to determine the
constitutionality of the death penalty fails to respect the values implicit
in the Constitution’s allocation of decision-making in this context.”102
But while there is a constitutional mandate for jury decision-making,
capital outcomes are also subject to other demands and we cannot
evaluate whether there has been a violation of equal protection or of
the Eighth Amendment without looking at the entire population of
death-eligible cases. Thus, in 177 of the 205 death-eligible cases included
in the Connecticut death penalty study, no jury evaluated the
appropriate punishment for the death-eligible defendant for any of a
number of reasons: the case was not capitally charged, the prosecutor
chose not to seek the death penalty, or a guilty plea or some other factor
diverted the case from a capital sentencing jury determination.103 A
scientific study must look at all 205 cases in the population of deatheligible cases (most of which will not entail a jury sentencing
determination), and cannot blindly accept the 28 sentencing decisions
that were rendered by a jury as somehow validating the entire capital
process.
At this point, we see that Justice Thomas has been overly simplistic
in extolling the informational advantages available in jury assessments
(by virtue of their extended exposure to details of the case before
them) in order to criticize the reliance by my egregiousness coders on
written summaries. My study gave eighteen coders written information
on 205 death-eligible cases in Connecticut.104 A jury of twelve would be
given more detailed information, but it would only be about a single
102. Id.
103. Donohue, An Empirical Evaluation, supra note 76, at 641.
104. Id.
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case. Because a critical goal of the coding exercise is to provide a
relative assessment of the egregiousness of the 205 cases, our eighteen
coders had a much better sense of what cases were unusually egregious
than any jury, which would only have information on one case, would
possess. In other words, the egregiousness study not only had 50 percent
more individuals looking at each case (albeit with less complete
information), but each egregiousness coder had information on 205
times as many cases as any juror would have.
2. The Need to Screen out Certain Information from Coders
Justices Scalia and Thomas also showed no understanding of the
disadvantages posed by some of the information that was available to
the jurors, but not to the egregiousness coders. Specifically, the
egregiousness coders were not apprised of the race and ethnicity of the
defendants and victims.105 This was of course a critical element of the
study because justifying the validity of a jury sentence of death by
virtue of the fact that the jury rendered that particular judgment
eliminates the possibility of ascertaining whether that decision was the
product of racial or ethnic bias.
Moreover, if the summaries have adequately captured the critical
details of the crime and the defendant, then stripping away the
prejudicial, emotion-laden, and irrelevant information that is generated
during the course of a criminal trial—in fact, many of the factors that
Justice Thomas specifically extolled106—would actually aid in the
process of generating valid egregiousness assessments. Unlike actual
jurors, my coders were not influenced by inflammatory appeals or
misconduct by prosecutors (or defense lawyers for that matter).107 Thus,
even if one had unlimited funds and could assign eighteen coders to sit
in on the entirety of every capital sentencing hearing (thereby perfectly
replicating everything that the jury heard), it would not give us
information on more than a small portion of the 205 cases (because of
105. Id.
106. Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2750 (Thomas, J., concurring).
107. For example, during the penalty phase of the trial of current Connecticut death row
inmate Richard Reynolds, the prosecutor John Connelly “made irrelevant and prejudicial
references to the family of Williams [the deceased] during voir dire, cross-examination and closing
arguments; invited the jury, during closing arguments to ignore the legal standards governing the
determination of when to impose the death penalty; and injected his personal opinions and beliefs
into his closing arguments.” State v. Reynolds, 836 A.2d 224, 333 (Conn. 2003). While the
Connecticut Supreme Court pointedly rebuked Connelly for his misconduct, it did not reverse
the death sentence. This was not an isolated instance of improper conduct by Connelly during
capital sentencing hearings. Id. at 333 n.180.
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the infrequency among death-eligible cases of capital sentencing
hearings), nor would it provide the appropriately shielded information
concerning the race and ethnicity of the defendant and victim.
3. Responding to Justice Scalia’s Emotional Claims with Empirical
Evidence
Justice Scalia chastised Justice Breyer with the emotional claim that
“I would not presume to tell parents whose life has been forever altered
by the brutal murder of a child that life imprisonment is punishment
enough.”108 He seems to suggest that Justice Breyer is implicitly
sending this message to a stock of parents grieving over their murdered
children. But for a host of reasons, very few parents whose children
have been brutally murdered see the murderer executed. For example,
in Connecticut, it is a capital felony to kill a child under age sixteen, and
46 of the 205 death-eligible cases involved such a killing.109 Yet, only
two of those 46 killings led to a sustained death sentence.110 In other
words, Connecticut prosecutors and jurors are indeed telling 44 of 46
parents with a brutally murdered child that “life imprisonment is
punishment enough.”
Perhaps this rare invocation of the death penalty for child murder
in Connecticut serves a retributive rationale because the two worst of
these cases led to death sentences? No. Indeed, many death-eligible
child killings rated more egregious than the two crimes leading to a
death sentence did not end up on death row in Connecticut. Under the
Composite egregiousness measure, thirteen death-eligible child
murders that did not generate the ultimate punishment were rated
equally or more egregious to the two on death row. The comparable
number of equally or more egregious cases under the Overall
egregiousness measure was ten.111 While Scalia thought his emotional
argument buttressed a retributive rationale for the death penalty, the
empirical evidence on child murders once again highlights the
retributive infirmity in Connecticut’s capital punishment regime.
Without capital punishment, each horribly suffering parent could take
comfort in knowing that the killer of his or her child had received the
harshest punishment allowed by law. With it, 94 percent of the suffering
108. Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2748 (Scalia, J., concurring).
109. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-54b (2005).
110. The two on death row were Todd Rizzo and Russell Peeler, who both had identical
egregiousness scores of 9.56 on the Composite 4–12 measure and 4.28 on the Overall 1–5 measure.
111. Author’s own calculation using data from Donohue, An Empirical Evaluation, supra
note 76.
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parents will not find that comfort, and many will be bewildered why
their even more atrocious victimization was treated more leniently than
the two cases that did receive the ultimate punishment.
4. Justice Thomas’s Misguided Critique
Justice Thomas also tries to make a broadside critique against the
use of empirical studies, making the following incorrect and misleading
statement:
[T]he results of these studies are inherently unreliable because they
purport to control for egregiousness by quantifying moral depravity
in a process that is itself arbitrary, not to mention dehumanizing.
One such study’s explanation of how the author assigned “depravity
points” to identify the “worst of the worst” murderers proves the
point well.112 Each aggravating factor received a point value based
on the “blameworth[iness]” of the action associated with it. . . .
Killing a prison guard, for instance, earned a defendant three
“depravity points” because it improved the case for complete
incapacitation, while killing a police officer merited only two,
because, “considered dispassionately,” such acts do “not seem be a
sine qua non of the worst criminals.” . . . (Do not worry, the author
reassures us, “many killers of police officers accrue depravity points
in other ways that clearly put them among the worst criminals.” . . .
). Killing a child under the age of 12 was worth two depravity points,
because such an act “seems particularly heartless,” but killing
someone over the age of 70 earned the murderer only one, for
although “elderly victims tug at our hearts,” they do so “less” than
children “because the promise of a long life is less.” . . . Killing to
make a political statement was worth three depravity points; killing
out of racial hatred, only two . . . . It goes on, but this small sample
of the moral judgments on which this study rested shows just how
unsuitable this evidence is to serve as a basis for a judicial decision
declaring unconstitutional a punishment duly enacted in more than
30 States, and by the Federal Government.113

What makes Justice Thomas’ statement deceptive is that it appears
a paragraph after he explicitly stated that he deemed “the Donohue
study [to be the one] on which JUSTICE BREYER relies most
heavily.”114 It would be natural then to conclude that Justice Thomas’s
criticism applies to my study, when it certainly does not. In a deft bait-

112. David McCord, Lightning Still Strikes, 71 BROOKLYN L. REV. 797, 833–34 (2005).
113. Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2752 (Thomas, J., concurring).
114. Id. at 2751.
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and-switch argument, Justice Thomas lashes out at a completely
different study and criticizes that study for using a methodology that I
specifically did not use.115 That is, I did not go through and assign
“depravity points” to various crimes as the criticized study did (nor did
any of the other egregiousness studies I cited above from Sellin and
Wolfgang to Rossi et al to Kahneman et al).116 I find it troubling that—
in a capital case no less—Justice Thomas would attempt to discredit an
empirical study on a basis that he almost certainly understood, or
should have understood, did not apply.
5. Giving Content to “the Worst of the Worst”
Justice Thomas dismissed Justice Breyer’s arbitrariness analysis,
stating: “[i]n my decades, on the Court, I have not seen a capital crime
that could not be considered sufficiently “blameworthy” to merit a
death sentence. . . . “117 It is a bit unclear what Justice Thomas is claiming
here, but he is almost certainly confusing two distinct, albeit related,
issues. The first relates to the absolute threshold level of egregiousness
that establishes the basis for a constitutionally permissible sentence of
death and the second relates to the relative egregiousness of the cases
that actually are sentenced to death within that permissible range. The
first point was addressed by the Supreme Court in Atkins in 2002, which
stated that Godfrey v. Georgia, shows that “the culpability of the
average murderer is insufficient to justify the most extreme sanction
available to the State.”118 Presumably, Justice Thomas means that all of
the capital cases that he has seen at the Supreme Court are above this
egregiousness threshold (a point about which most other Supreme
Court justices have disagreed since 2002).119
Justice Thomas ignores Justice Breyer’s second point that the way
in which one limits arbitrariness in implementation and establishes that
a capital regime is measurably advancing a retributive goal is to follow
the dictates that Justice Souter noted in Roper v. Simmons that “within
the category of capital crimes, the death penalty must be reserved for
115. Id. at 2747–48.
116. Sellin and Wolfgang, supra note 77, at 135; Rossi et al, supra note 79, at 225; Kahneman
et al., supra note 81, at 51.
117. Glossip, 135 S. Ct. at 2752 (Thomas, J., concurring).
118. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 319 (2002).
119. Specifically, the six to three decision in Atkins, id., as well as the five to four decision in
Roper v. Simmons, 543 U. S. 551 (2005), ruled that cases before the court involving a “mentally
retarded offender” and a murderer under 18 years of age were not sufficiently blameworthy to
justify a constitutionally permissible sentence of death. Justice Thomas dissented in both those
cases.
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‘the worst of the worst.’”120 In other words, within the class of deatheligible cases, the death penalty regime is operating arbitrarily—and
not measurably furthering a retributive goal—if the penalty of death is
not being reserved for the most egregious murders.
An analogy may help to make the point. Assume that there were
205 applicants for an exclusive club, of whom, only nine would be
selected. If the relevant metric for acceptance were being very wealthy,
a low enough threshold might enable all 205 candidates to satisfy the
wealth standard for admission. In this analogy, Justice Thomas would
be saying that all 205 candidates meet the wealth criteria for the club.
But then, continuing the analogy, Justice Breyer would point out that if
this club is very exclusive, the club would not want to accept the nine
least wealthy applicants or even a randomly sampled nine candidates,
but rather should select the nine wealthiest candidates.
Similarly, even if Justice Thomas determined all nine of the 205
death-eligible cases in the Connecticut study were sufficiently
blameworthy to merit a death sentence under the first standard, he
would presumably recognize the problems for a retributive rationale if
Connecticut were to execute the nine lowest-egregiousness cases or just
nine randomly selected cases. Rather than being limited to the worst of
the worst, the death-penalty under these scenarios would be limited
either to the nine least bad of the 205 death-eligible cases or just nine
selected at random from the 205. In neither situation would the death
penalty be measurably furthering a retributive goal since the heart of
retribution—that the worst crimes receive the harshest—would be
violated.
Figure 1 clearly depicts a problematic distribution of capital
sentencing under the Atkins standard. Perhaps Justice Thomas would
argue that there is no way to differentiate the egregiousness of crimes,
so the Figure 1 results are not meaningful. But this argument conflicts
directly with both logic121 and the holdings of Godfrey, Atkins, and
120. Kansas v. Marsh, 548 U.S. 163, 206 (2006) (Souter, J., dissenting).
121. We have already noted that killing three is worse than killing one, a fact explicitly
recognized in the Connecticut death penalty statute in establishing that a killing involving
multiple victims qualifies as a capital felony. Similarly, every death penalty statute contains some
grading language that can provide a basis for a death sentence when the crime is either “heinous,
cruel, or depraved” or “outrageously vile or inhuman.” Indeed, most cases that result in a death
sentence in Connecticut do so because the crime is deemed to fall within the “heinous, cruel, or
depraved” statutory aggravating circumstance. See Donohue, Capital Punishment in Connecticut,
1973-2007: A Comprehensive Evaluation from 4600 murders to One Execution 114 (2014),
http://works.bepress.com/john_donohue/137/ (“This factor was found in ten of the twelve cases
resulting in a death sentence, seven times as the sole aggravating factor and three times in
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Roper, as well as with the abundant social science evidence establishing
that there is a broad social consensus on the relative egregiousness of
crimes.122 Indeed, Justice Thomas refutes any claim that the
egregiousness of capital cases cannot be compared by deliberately
selecting three particularly horrible murders for gruesome description
(following in a misguided tradition blazed by Justice Scalia that I
discuss below).123 And that is precisely my point: one can assess
different levels of egregiousness, and if the death penalty is not limited
to the worst cases, then it is operating in an arbitrary fashion rather than
in a way that justifies on legitimate grounds the few cases that lead to
execution versus the many that do not.124
The respective anecdotes they report provide a telling contrast
between Justices Thomas and Breyer. While Justice Thomas is moved
by the horrors of three particularly egregious crimes, which he
describes in detail to support the death penalty, Justice Breyer’s Glossip
opinion recited the details of three of the six men exonerated from
death row in 2014 alone as evidence of the danger of wrongful capital
convictions.125 It is difficult to imagine under what social welfare
function, society would be deemed to be better off by killing a few
particularly bad defendants (who would otherwise serve life prison
sentences) and a similar number of innocent defendants. With zero
credible evidence of deterrence, Justice Breyer’s anecdotes are clearly
focused on a much more important concern for the criminal justice
system.
One noteworthy difference between the separate Glossip opinions
authored by Justices Scalia and Thomas is that Justice Scalia refrained
from his earlier tendency to enthusiastically recite the horrific details
of various capital crimes, leaving that chore to Justice Thomas. A likely
explanation for this division of labor is that Justice Scalia had been
badly embarrassed by his miscue in his famed skirmish with Justice
conjunction with one or more other aggravating factors.”). The thousands of judicial decisions
upholding death sentences under these (and other) provisions clearly show the factors that courts
deem to render a case more or less egregious.
122. See Sellin and Wolfgang, supra note 77; Rossi et al, supra note 79; Kahneman et al.,
supra note 81.
123. Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. at 2752–53 (Thomas, J., concurring).
124. But if my claim that one can ascertain which crimes are most egregious is incorrect, then
the effort to justify the constitutionality of the death penalty on retribution grounds fails for
another reason. One cannot satisfy the Atkins standard that the death penalty “measurably
contributes” to retribution if there is no basis for saying that one crime is more egregious than
another.
125. Id. at 2755 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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Blackmun in Callins v. Collins in which he derided Blackmun’s concern
for a death row inmate and his failure to reference “the case of the 11year old girl raped by four men and then killed by stuffing her panties
down her throat. See McCollum v. North Carolina, . . . . How enviable a
quiet death by lethal injection compared with that!”126
Justice Scalia’s rhetoric was misguided in a number of ways. First, it
is illogical to argue that the most egregious possible crime can provide
support for the imposition of all death sentences. Justice Scalia stated:
“Justice Blackmun begins his statement by describing with poignancy
the death of a convicted murderer by lethal injection. He chooses, as
the case in which to make that statement, one of the less brutal of the
murders that regularly come before us . . . .”127 In other words, Justice
Scalia understood that the degree of egregiousness of crimes leading to
sentences of death can vary widely. Citing the most egregious murder
as a justification for the death penalty would only make sense if the
death penalty would only be applied to the most egregious crimes. Yet,
Justice Breyer’s point is that, if one looks at the actual administration
of capital regimes, the death penalty is not limited to “the worst of the
worst offenders,” as the Supreme Court has said it must be.128 If Scalia
wants to highlight the egregiousness of crimes to support retributive
rationality of the death penalty, he should be establishing that the least
egregious case leading to execution is (or at least tends to be) worse
than the most egregious cases not resulting in execution. It scarcely
needs pointing out that no such claim is even remotely plausible (as
Figure 1 makes abundantly clear).
Second, Scalia’s reference to the horrific killing of the eleven-yearold girl,129 which he thought was buttressing his argument for the
constitutionality of the death penalty, ironically underscored another
problematic feature of capital punishment in the United States. The
more heinous the crime, the greater the pressure to solve a case and the
greater the likelihood that anger and emotion will undermine the
capacity of the criminal justice system to correctly identify and
126. Callins v. Collins, 510 U.S. 1141, 1143 (1994) (Scalia, J., concurring); McCollum v. North
Carolina, 512 U.S. 1254 (1994).
127. Id. at 1142.
128. Breyer writes: “JUSTICE THOMAS catalogues the tragic details of various capital
cases . . . (concurring opinion), but this misses my point. Every murder is tragic, but unless we
return to the mandatory death penalty struck down in Woodson, . . . the constitutionality of
capital punishment rests on its limited application to the worst of the worst. . . . And this extensive
body of evidence suggests that it is not so limited.” Glossip, 135 S.Ct. at 2762 (Breyer, J.,
dissenting).
129. Callins, 510 U.S. at 1143 (Scalia, J., concurring).

DONAHUE (DO NOT DELETE)

82

DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & PUBLIC POLICY

9/29/2016 4:04 PM

[VOL. 11:1&2

prosecute the perpetrator.130 As we now know, the death row inmate
that Justice Scalia described—Henry Lee McCollum—was completely
innocent (as confirmed by the DNA-identified actual perpetrator) and
would have been executed if Justice Scalia’s opposition to the extensive
array of appeals afforded to death row inmates had been heeded.131
Remarkably, Justice Scalia actually flirted with the claim (in a 2009
opinion in the Troy Davis case132) that it is constitutionally permissible
to execute innocent convicts:
This Court has never held that the Constitution forbids the
execution of a convicted defendant who has had a full and fair trial
but is later able to convince a habeas court that he is ‘actually’
innocent. Quite to the contrary, we have repeatedly left that
question unresolved, while expressing considerable doubt that any
claim based on alleged ‘actual innocence’ is constitutionally
cognizable.133

One can only wonder at the plain meaning of “cruel and unusual
punishment” if Justice Scalia’s claim has any substantive merit.
In Glossip, Justice Scalia dismissed the concern that eliminating the
death penalty will solve the problem of an enhanced risk of wrongful
convictions for the most heinous crimes on the grounds that the
defendants would then languish in prison with little hope of correction:
The reality is that any innocent defendant is infinitely better of off
appealing a death sentence than a sentence of life imprisonment …
[because] the capital defendant will obtain endless legal assistance
from the abolition lobby (and legal favor from abolitionist judges),
while the lifer languishes unnoticed behind bars.134

I assume that Justice Scalia’s use of the word “infinite” is intentionally
hyperbolic,135 but it is unclear why he believed the Innocence Project
130. Samuel R. Gross, The Risks of Death: Why Erroneous Convictions Are Common in
Capital Cases, 44 BUFFALO L. REV. 469, 474 (1996)
131. McCollum was held on death row for 30 years prior to his DNA exoneration. Dahlia
Lithwick, A Horrifying Miscarriage of Justice in North Carolina, SLATE (September 3, 2014),
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2014/09/henry_lee_mccollum_cle
ared_by_dna_evidence_in_north_carolina_after_spending.html.
132. Davis, 557 U. S. 952, 954 (2009) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
133. Id at 955.
134. Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2747 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
135. For example, while I was working on the evaluation of the Connecticut death penalty,
two murder convicts serving life terms were exonerated by DNA evidence after they had served
more than two decades in Connecticut prisons. Miguel Roman, arrested in 1988, was prosecuted
and convicted of the Carmen Lopez murder. After more than twenty years behind bars, Roman
was exonerated by DNA evidence that was tested at the urging of the Connecticut Innocence
Project. Roman was released from prison in December 2008, and Connecticut then prosecuted

DONAHUE (DO NOT DELETE)

2016]

9/29/2016 4:04 PM

EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS AND CAPITAL PUNISHMENT

83

would close its doors if capital punishment were eliminated.
Presumably, it would then be able to devote more of its limited
resources to trying to secure release for wrongfully convicted lifers.
Executing an innocent person is a uniquely horrible prospect—recall
Kant’s emphasis, frequently echoed by the Supreme Court, that death
is different in kind from other punishments136—so one would expect
considerable resources would be devoted to avoid this unusually
lamentable, and irreversible, outcome.
C. Most Sentenced to Death Will not be Executed
Justice Breyer also cites some particularly compelling descriptive
statistics that further undermine the claim of retributive benefit:
Consider, for example, what actually happened to the 183 inmates
sentenced to death in 1978. As of 2013 (35 years later), 38 (or 21%
of them) had been executed; 132 (or 72%) had had their convictions
or sentences overturned or commuted; and 7 (or 4%) had died of
other (likely natural) causes. Six (or 3%) remained on death row. 137

When 75 percent of those who are sentenced to death are not
executed,138 it is hard to see how this system could possibly be thought
to measurably contribute to retribution. Every sentence of death—
indeed, every capital prosecution—involves an enormous marshalling
of a complex and protracted legal process with its attendant emotional
strain on the parties, their families, and the criminal justice system. That
this lumbering machinery of death must be laboriously engaged for the
wide pool of cases for which a death sentence was sought to generate a
relatively small percentage of capital sentences that is then
Pedro Miranda for the murder of Lopez based on a DNA match of the evidence that exculpated
Roman. Miranda was convicted of a capital felony in this case in 2011. See Alaine Griffin, State
of Connecticut Awards $6 Million to Miguel Roman, Wrongly Imprisoned for Years, HARTFORD
COURANT (Feb. 8, 2016), http://www.courant.com/breaking-news/hc-miguel-roman-wrongfullyimprisoned-award-0209-20160208-story.html.
Kenneth Ireland was convicted of the 1986 rape-murder of Barbara Pelkey. In 2009,
however, the intervention of the Connecticut Innocence Project led to Ireland being cleared by
DNA evidence, after he had spent more than 21 years in prison. Four months later the state
arrested Kevin Benefield for the murder, based on a DNA match. See Bill Leukhardt & David
Owens, DNA Finds New Suspect in ‘86 Slaying, HARTFORD COURANT, Dec. 30, 2009, at A1;
Alaine Griffin, Kevin Benefield Convicted of 1986 Murder for Which Another Man Served 21
Years in Prison, HARTFORD COURANT (Jan. 18, 2012), http://articles.courant.com/2012-0118/news/hc-benefield-pelkey-0119-20120118_1_barbara-pelkey-connecticut-innocence-projectkenneth-ireland.
136. Kant, supra note 64, at 87.
137. Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2755 (2015) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
138. Tracy L. Snell, Capital Punishment 2013–Statistical Tables, 19 BUREAU OF JUST. STAT.
(2014).
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dramatically reduced to a yet smaller number of executions
underscores Justice Breyer’s view that massive resources are being
expended and social costs imposed to pursue a system that serves no
obvious penological justification while being highly morally and
constitutionally contentious.
III. RACIAL DISPARITY IN CAPITAL OUTCOMES
Furman v. Georgia139 catalyzed tremendous academic attention on
the relationship between race and capital sentencing. There is now an
expansive empirical literature—analyzing numerous states across the
country—presenting compelling evidence that race influences the
death penalty decisions of prosecutors and jurors. Justice Breyer
referenced a few of the studies in this literature, but he only scratched
the surface of the voluminous body of research.
A. The Baldus Study
The seminal work in this literature—Equal Justice and the Death
Penalty140—was conducted by a research team led by Professor David
Baldus that examined capital sentencing in Georgia. The Baldus study
investigated the effect of race on decisions throughout the charging and
sentencing process by analyzing a large stratified random sample of
1,066 defendants selected from the universe of cases of the 2,484
defendants who were charged with homicide and subsequently
convicted of murder or voluntary manslaughter in Georgia in the years
from 1973 to 1979.141 The researchers then weighted this sample, which
included 127 defendants who had been sentenced to death,142 to
evaluate the effect of race on capital sentencing in the case universe as
a whole.
Baldus included 39 specific features of each crime as explanatory
variables in his base regression model designed to explain capital
sentencing using the entire death-eligible sample. Importantly, the
model controlled only for features of the crime itself, rather than the
system’s treatment of the defendant following his/her arrest.143 This is

139. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
140. DAVID C. BALDUS, GEORGE G. WOODWORTH & CHARLES A. PULASKI JR., EQUAL
JUSTICE AND THE DEATH PENALTY: A LEGAL AND EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS (Northeastern Univ.
Press 1990) [hereinafter Equal Justice and the Death Penalty].
141. Id. at 45, 67 n.10.
142. Id. at 45.
143. Id. at 46–50, 57–59.
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true not only for the base model, but also in Baldus’s set of extended
models, including as many as 230 explanatory variables.144
This comprehensive analysis showed that defendants convicted of
murdering a white victim were statistically significantly more likely
than defendants convicted of murdering a black victim to be sentenced
to death.145 Baldus’s logistic regression model that included 39
legitimate variables became the core piece of evidence regarding raceof-victim discrimination in McCleskey v. Kemp.146 It showed that the
odds that defendants convicted of murdering a white victim would be
sentenced to death were 4.3 times the odds that defendants convicted
of murdering a black victim would be sentenced to death.147 This
relationship was statistically significant at the .005 level.148
The Baldus team then went on to examine how the race of the
defendant and victim interacted to influence capital sentencing
outcomes.149 The study found that, controlling for egregiousness, cases
involving black defendants and white victims were substantially more
likely to result in a death sentence than cases involving other racial
combinations of defendant and victim race.150
B. Other Pre-1990 Studies of Racial Disparity
The regression models of the Baldus team that were described
above uniformly demonstrated racial disparities in the administration
of capital punishment in Georgia during the period of study. Numerous
well-controlled studies from jurisdictions across the country have
similarly found racial disparities in capital sentencing. In 1990, the
United States General Accounting Office reviewed studies by 21 sets
of researchers based on 23 distinct datasets and summarized the thenexisting literature, as follows:
In 82 percent of the studies, race of victim was found to influence
the likelihood of being charged with capital murder or receiving the
death penalty, i.e., those who murdered whites were found to be
more likely to be sentenced to death than those who murdered
blacks. This finding was remarkably consistent across data sets,

144. See id. at App. L, 612–15.
145. Id. at 656–70.
146. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. at 279 (1987).
147. Equal Justice and the Death Penalty, supra note 140, at 319–320.
148. Id. at 319–20. For a list of the included variables, see Equal Justice and the Death Penalty,
supra note 140, at 630–31.
149. Id.
150. Id.
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states, data collection methods, and analytic techniques. The finding
held for high, medium, and low quality studies. . . . [Our] synthesis
supports a strong race of victim influence.151

C. Ten Post-1990 Studies Examining Racial Disparities in 8 States and
2 Counties
Findings of racial disparities in the administration of capital
punishment are similarly robust in the post-1990 literature. Table 1
presents the regression results of ten such methodologically rigorous
studies on the effect of victim race on capital sentencing outcomes (the
Baldus study results on Georgia are shown in Row 2 of Panel A). The
relative probabilities in this Table were generated by regression
analyses that controlled for variables that may affect decisions related
to capital sentencing.152
Table 1 summarizes the evidence concerning racial disparity in
capital sentencing from eight different states as well as for two counties
that are particularly active in employing the death penalty. The major
finding is that defendants convicted of murdering a white victim face
considerably higher odds of being sentenced to death than similarlysituated defendants convicted of murdering a black victim.153 At the
state level, these relative odds range from roughly 2.5 to 4.5, with only
Ohio below that level at 1.66, which is roughly the level observed in
Harris County, Texas.154 The ratio of 37.04 for East Baton Rouge is
strikingly large.

151. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, DEATH PENALTY SENTENCING: RESEARCH
INDICATES
PATTERN
OF
RACIAL
DISPARITIES
3,
5,
6–6
(1990),
http://archive.gao.gov/t2pbat11/140845.pdf.
152. See infra text accompanying notes 155–64.
153. Id.
154. Id.
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Table 1. Regression Analyses on the Race-of-Victim Effect and Capital
Sentencing

Location

Period
of
Study

Cases
Analyzed

Relative

Odds

of

Being Sentenced to

Statistical
Significance

Death for Killing a
White Victim Rather
Than a Black Victim
(Controlling for Other
Relevant Variables)

Panel
States

A:

California155
Georgia156

19901999
19731979

2.46

< .001

4.3

< .005

Homicides

3.42

< .001

defendants

2.48

< .01

3.7

< .05

Reported
homicides
Defendants
charged

with

homicide

and

subsequently
convicted

of

murder

or

voluntary
manslaughter

Florida157

19761987
19881997

Illinois158

convicted of firstdegree murder

Maryland

159

19781999

death-eligible firstor

second-degree

murder cases

155. Michael L. Radelet & Glenn L. Pierce, The Impact of Legally Inappropriate Factors on
Death Sentencing for California Homicides, 1990-1999, 46 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1, 35 (2005).
156. See Equal Justice and the Death Penalty, supra note 140, at 319–20.
157. Michael L. Radelet & Glenn L. Pierce, Choosing Those Who Will Die: Race and the
Death Penalty in Florida, 43 FLA. L. REV. 28 (1991).
158. Glenn L. Pierce & Michael L. Radelet, Race, Region, and Death Sentencing in Illinois,
1988-1997, 81 OR. L. REV. 39, 95 (2002).
159. Raymond Paternoster et al, Justice by Geography and Race: the Administration of the
Death Penalty in Maryland, 1978-1999, 4 U. MD. L.J. RACE, RELIGION, GENDER & CLASS 1, 36
(2004). Additionally, their regression analysis controlling for a wide range of case characteristics
revealed that black-on-white murders are significantly more likely to result in a death sentence
than black-on-black and white-on-white murders. This is consistent with the raw Maryland data
shown in Table 2, below.
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Missouri160

19771991

North
Carolina161
Ohio162

19802007
19811994

Panel
Counties
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nonnegligent
homicides
Homicides

2.61

< .10

2.96

< .001

Homicide

1.66

< .01

B:

East Baton
Rouge,
LA163
Harris
County,
TX164

19902008
19921999

defendants
37.04
convicted of
homicide
1.63
defendants

< .005
n/a

indicted for
capital murder

D. Two National Studies of Racial Disparity
In a sophisticated national-level study, Explaining Death Row’s
Population and Racial Composition, researchers Blume, Eisenberg, and
Wells analyzed data on murders and the composition of death row from
1977 through 1999 in the 31 states that admitted ten or more defendants
to death row during this time period.165 This comprehensive study
160. Jonathan R. Sorensen & Donald H. Wallace, Capital Punishment in Missouri:
Examining the Issue of Racial Disparity, 13 BEHAV. SCIENCES & L. 61 (1995).
161. Michael L. Radelet & Glenn L. Pierce, Race and Death Sentencing in North Carolina
1980-2007, 89 N.C. L. REV. 2119 (2011); see also Isaac Unah, Choosing Those Who Will Die: The
Effect of Race, Gender, and Law in Prosecutorial Decision to Seek the Death Penalty in Durham
County, North Carolina, 28 MICH. J. RACE & L. 135 (2009) (“Durham county prosecutors are
43% more likely to seek the death penalty when a Black defendant kills a White victim compared
to a situation where a Black defendant kills a Black victim.”).
162. Marian R. Williams & Jefferson E. Holcomb, Racial Disparity and Death Sentences in
Ohio, 29 J. OF CRIM. JUST., 211, 215 tbl.3 (2001).
163. Glenn L. Pierce & Michael L. Radelet, Death Sentencing in East Baton Rouge Parish, 71
LA. L. REV. 647, 669 (2011). The county (or “parish”) studied in Louisiana, East Baton Rouge,
provides important insight into capital sentencing in the state. Of the 84 people on death row in
Louisiana at the end of 2009, 16 were convicted and sentenced in East Baton Rouge Parish—
more than in any other parish in the state. Moreover, the composition of East Baton Rouge’s
contribution to death row is strikingly monochromatic: All 16 of the parish’s death row inmates
are black. Id. at 650.
164. Scott Phillips, Legal Disparities in the Capital of Capital Punishment, 99 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 717, 746 (2009). The Texas county examined in this study, Harris County, also
provides considerable insight into the relationship between race and capital sentencing. Harris
County has executed more people since 1976 than any U.S. state other than Texas. Id. at 720.
165. John Blume, Theodore Eisenberg & Martin T. Wells, Explaining Death Row’s
Population and Racial Composition, J. EMPIRICAL L. STUD. 165, 169.

DONAHUE (DO NOT DELETE)

2016]

EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS AND CAPITAL PUNISHMENT

9/29/2016 4:04 PM

89

included 5,953 of the 5,988 (99.4%) persons admitted to death row in
the U.S. between 1977 and 1999.166 The researchers obtained data on the
characteristics of murders, the racial composition of death row, and
several other legal and political dimensions.167 They then compared the
overall population of murderers to the death row population along a
number of dimensions to determine which factors are related to the
likelihood of being convicted of capital murder and placed on death
row.168
The researchers found that variation in black representation on
death rows in states across the country was powerfully influenced by
the proportion of all murders that involve a black offender and a white
victim.169 This finding that black on white murders were treated more
harshly than other types of murders was statistically significant at the
.01 level.170
Blume, Eisenberg, and Wells also calculated the rate at which
murder cases involving different combinations of defendant and victim
race resulted in death sentences for the eight states for which they had
this complete data for the period from 1977-2000.171 Table 2 displays
this data and shows that cases involving a black offender and a white
victim are far more likely to result in the offender being placed on
death row than cases involving other combinations of offender and
victim race. Note that the combination of a black offender and a white
victim leads to a death sentence at a rate from roughly three to 23 times
the rate seen in black offender-black victim cases. The racial disparities
in capital sentencing in the listed states are glaringly large and
statistically significant at conventional levels.172
A recent study by Harvard economics professor Alberto F. Alesina
and his coauthor Eliana La Ferrara entitled A Test of Racial Bias in
166. Id. at 169.
167. Id. at 168–171.
168. See id. at 181, 183, 185, 191, 197.
169. Id. at 193–94.
170. Id. at 190–91.
171. Id. at 197.
172. For each of the four race of defendant and victim categories, Table 2 provides the raw
proportion that is sentenced to death. Conceivably, the black on white murders could be treated
more harshly than black on black murders because the former are more egregious. Importantly,
this was not found to be the case in Georgia. See Equal Justice and the Death Penalty, supra note
140, at 656–70. Similarly, my Connecticut death penalty regression analysis for both capitally
charging and sentencing shows that the harsher treatment of black on white murders is not
explained by the level of egregiousness of the crimes. See Donohue, An Empirical Evaluation,
supra note 76, at 644–645; infra Tables 6–7 for capital sentencing. One can see the results for
capital charging in Tables 4–6 of this article, infra.
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Capital Sentencing provides additional support for the Blume et al
findings.173 The paper proposes a novel test of racial bias in capital
sentencing based upon patterns of judicial errors in lower courts that
vary according to the race of the defendant and victim.174 Looking at
nationwide data from 1973-1995, the authors once again find robust
evidence that minority on white murders are treated significantly more
harshly than minority on minority murders.175
E. The Nature of Racial Bias in Capital Punishment
The studies discussed in the previous section provide strong
evidence that minority defendants who kill white victims are treated
more harshly by capital regimes, even controlling for possible
explanations such as the egregiousness of the crime. An important 2006
study provides insight into the nature of this racial bias.

173. Alberto F. Alesina & Eliana La Ferrara, A Test of Racial Bias in Capital Sentencing, 104
AM. ECON. REV. 3397 (2014).
174. Id.
175. Id.
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Table 2. Capital Sentencing Rates by Race of Defendant and Victim
in 8 States (1977-2000)
State

% Sentenced % Sentenced to % Sentenced
to Death for
Death for
to Death for
Murders with Murders with a Murders with
a Black
Black Offender
a White
Offender and
and White
Offender and
a Black
Victim
Black Victim
Victim
(C)
(A)
(B)

Georgia

9.9
(72/726)
4.2
(16/375)
5.2
(25/479)
10.1
(18/178)
4.9
(46/947)
6.8
(50/738)
6.5
(46/713)
4.8
(19/400)

0.5
(35/7091)
Indiana
0.6
(12/2151)
Maryland
0.2
(10/4174)
Nevada
2.5
(11/442)
Pennsy1.8
lvania (112/6310)
South
0.3
Carolina (14/4784)
Virginia
0.4
(18/4975)
Arizona*
0.5
(13/2416)

2.1 (4/187)
0.0 (0/100)
0.7 (1/137)
1.3 (1/80)
1.2 (4/335)
5.0 (9/179)
2.3 (5/217)
2.8 (7/247)

% Sentenced Ratio
to Death for
of
Murders with (B) /
a White
(A)
Offender and
White Victim
(D)

4.2
(114/2734)
2.2
(49/2272)
1.4
(20/1429)
3.7
(46/1244)
2.2
(90/4055)
2.7
(72/2654)
1.8
(58/3167)
5.9
(95/1613)

20.1
7.6
21.8
4.1
2.7
23.2
17.8
8.8

*Note: The data for Arizona combines Blacks and Hispanics into a
single “minority” category. Thus, the numbers in the last row of the
table for Arizona Black Offender and Black Victim cases also includes
Hispanic offenders and victims.
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Using a dataset collected by David Baldus, Jennifer Eberhardt and
her fellow researchers analyzed over 600 death-eligible cases in
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania between 1979 and 1999.176 Forty-four of the
cases involved a black defendant and white victim; another 308 had a
black defendant and a black victim.177 Over 40 (mostly white) Stanford
undergrads rated “the stereotypicality of each Black defendant’s
appearance,” using whatever indication they felt appropriate.178 The
study found that “stereotypically black” defendants who had been
convicted of murdering a white victim were more likely to receive a
death sentence.179 Specifically, “24.4% of those Black defendants who
fell in the lower half of the stereotypicality distribution received a
death sentence, whereas 57.5% of those Black defendants who fell in
the upper half received a death sentence.”180
What establishes that this finding represents racial bias in the
capital punishment regime is the fact that when a black defendant was
accused of killing a black victim, the defendant’s “stereotypical
blackness” did not predict a sentence of death.181 In other words, it is
not something intrinsic to “stereotypical black” defendants that makes
them more likely to be sentenced to death, but rather how the system
processes their cases when race becomes salient, as it apparently does
in inter-racial killings.
F. Justices Scalia and Thomas in Glossip on Racial Disparities
Given the strength of the evidence showing such widespread racial
disparities in capital outcomes, one would imagine that the opinions of
Justices Scalia and Thomas in Glossip would address this troubling
issue in detail.182 In fact, Justice Scalia’s ode to the death penalty that
purports to refute the major points of Justice Breyer’s opinion makes
not a single reference to race or racial discrimination.183 Justice Thomas
176. Jennifer L. Eberhardt et al, Looking Deathworthy: Perceived Stereotypicality of Black
Defendants Predicts Capital-Sentencing Outcomes, 17 PSYCH. SCI. 383, 383–85 (2006).
177. Id. at 384.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. See id.
182. In Turner v. Murray, 476 U.S. 28, 35 (1986), Justice White’s majority opinion vacating a
death sentence for a black defendant convicted of killing a white victim expressed concern that
juror discretion in considering mitigation evidence provides “a unique opportunity for racial
prejudice to operate but remain undetected.”
183. Right from the start of his tenure on the Supreme Court, Justice Scalia showed little
concern about the influence of race on capital outcomes. As my colleague Mugambi Jouet has
noted, during the oral argument in McCleskey v. Kemp shortly after he became a justice, Justice
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addresses the issue in a single sentence characterized by another of his
bait and switch arguments.184
Specifically, Justice Thomas ignored all of the evidence discussed
above concerning racial disparities in capital punishment. He
responded to Justice Breyer’s reliance on my Connecticut study by
stating that “the primary explanation [the Donohue] regression
analysis revealed for the gap between the egregiousness scores and the
actual sentences was not the race or sex of the offender or victim, but
the locality in which the crime was committed.”185 Though Justice
Breyer found this geographic influence to be evidence of arbitrary
implementation of the death penalty, Justice Thomas thought this was
not a problem. Two points should be made on this issue.
First, while geography was the single most important explanation
for who received the Connecticut death penalty—far more important
than the comparative egregiousness of the crime, which Justice Breyer
argued should be paramount—the second most potent factor was race
(with minorities who killed whites treated far more harshly).186 Justice
Thomas’ insinuation that racial bias was not a serious problem in
Connecticut’s capital punishment regime because geography was a
more potent factor is like saying that cancer isn’t a problem because
cardiovascular disease kills more Americans.
Second, the geographic factor in Connecticut capital sentencing
was driven by the fact that the State’s Attorney in Waterbury (John
Connelly) was particularly enthusiastic about administering the death
penalty—to a degree that troubled some Connecticut attorneys and
Supreme Court justices.187 The Waterbury prosecutor was actually

Scalia derisively asked: “What if you do a statistical study that shows beyond question that people
who are naturally shifty-eyed are to a disproportionate extent convicted in criminal cases, does
that make the criminal process unlawful?” Mugambi Jouet, The Human Toll of Antonin Scalia’s
Time on the Court, SLATE (Feb. 17, 2016), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/
jurisprudence/2016/02/antonio_scalia_made_america_s_incarceration_problem_worse.html.
184. Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2750, 2752, reh’g denied, 136 S. Ct. 20 (2015) (Thomas, J.,
concurring).
185. Id.
186. Donohue, An Empirical Evaluation, supra note 76, at 663.
187. “Twice the Connecticut Supreme Court commented disapprovingly on [Connelly’s]
unprofessional manner during the penalty phase of a capital punishment case. . . . Norm Pattis, a
Waterbury trial attorney (who defended Connelly’s friend Martin Minella in the ensuing
corruption charges), wrote in his political eulogy for Connelly that ‘his almost combative glee in
sending people to the death house troubled me.” See Donohue, An Empirical Evaluation, supra
note 76, at 691–693.
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forced to resign in 2011 following a federal corruption investigation,188
which underscores that single individuals often play a huge role in
generating death sentences even when their judgment can be highly
questionable. The Connecticut experience with the imposition of death
sentences—to individuals who Connecticut prosecutors still fought to
execute despite the State’s prospective abolition of the death penalty
in 2012 and the subsequent Connecticut Supreme Court decision in
Santiago striking down the death penalty as violative of the state’s
constitution in August 2015—is an uncomfortable one for those who
believe in a government of laws rather than a government of men.189
G. Racial Disparities in Connecticut Capital Outcomes
Despite the strong evidence in the Baldus Report that race
influenced capital outcomes, the trial judge in McCleskey, a former
prosecutor who clearly was searching for reasons to find fault with the
Baldus study, rejected its findings as statistically unsound.190 A similar
dynamic existed in Connecticut when the trial judge—also a former
prosecutor—labored to avoid crediting the evidence of racial
disparities in Connecticut’s capital punishment regime. Just as Justice
Scalia in Glossip side-stepped the issue of racial discrimination, the trial
judge in Connecticut ignored the strong evidence of racial disparity in
capital charging without even a word of discussion.191 The evidence was
viewed quite differently when the issue came before the Connecticut
Supreme Court in State v. Santiago two months after Glossip, as
188. See Edmund H. Mahoney, Waterbury State’s Attorney John Connelly Pressured to Leave
Office; Will Retire Feb. 1, HARTFORD COURANT, Jan. 14, 2011.
189. After the decision in Santiago ruled the imposition of the death penalty to be
unconstitutional, the State sought re-hearing and was rebuffed. Since one Justice of the
Connecticut Supreme Court who had been a member of the majority retired shortly after Santiago
was decided, the State refused to accept the Santiago decision apparently hoping the new Justice
would side with the three dissenting Justices. On January 7, 2016, in the case of State v. Peeler, the
Connecticut Supreme Court allowed the State to argue that Santiago should be overturned.
Alaine Griffin, Death Penalty Back Before State Supreme Court, HARTFORD COURANT (Jan. 7,
2016),
http://www.courant.com/news/connecticut/hc-death-penalty-in-connecticut-20160107story.html; see State v. Peeler, 321 Conn. 375 (Conn. 2016). The prosecutorial push for execution
finally ended on May 26, 2016 when the Connecticut Supreme Court upheld the Santiago decision
in a 5-2 per curiam opinion in the Peeler case. Id.
190. McCleskey v. Zant, 580 F. Supp. 338, 379-80 (N.D. Ga. 1984). Interestingly, the U.S.
Supreme Court, perhaps recognizing the strength of the Baldus study, decided to presume its
statistical soundness, but then rejected it on the legal grounds that statistical evidence did not
satisfy the requirement of showing intentional racial discrimination in the particular case before
it. Remarkably, the author of the 5-4 McCleskey decision subsequently conceded that he should
have voted the other way in that case. He also acknowledged that he had been hampered by his
limited understanding of statistics as he evaluated the claims of racial disparity.
191. See Donohue, An Empirical Evaluation, supra note 76, at 639– 40.
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indicated in the concurring opinion of Justices Norcott and McDonald:
[T]he available evidence supports the conclusion that, when
members of minority groups who offend against whites are charged
with capital crimes and subjected to execution at far greater rates
than other defendants who commit comparable crimes, those
disparities are a result of racial biases and cannot be explained away
by other, innocuous factors.192

The opinion also noted:
Perhaps the most striking finding was that minority defendants who
committed capital eligible felonies against white victims in
Connecticut were charged with capital crimes in 85 percent of cases,
whereas prosecutors only sought a capital conviction approximately
60 percent of the time for crimes with minority victims.193

1. The Racial Disparity in Capital Charging
Indeed, the trial evidence of racial disparity in capital charging was
overwhelming, and all of the pre-trial evidence presented by both the
experts for the death row inmates (me) and the State (Stephan
Michelson) over many years—with a single, temporary and erroneous
exception—supported the conclusion that minority defendants who
killed white victims were charged at substantially higher rates than
minority defendants who killed minority victims.194 The momentary
exception was that Michelson’s final pre-trial regression seemed to
contradict the finding of racial disparity in capital charging, but this

192. State v. Santiago, 318 Conn. 140, 152 reconsideration denied, 319 Conn. 912 (2015)
(Norcott and McDonald, Js., concurring).
193. Id. at 159.
194. Michelson testified at trial that two years earlier after having completed seven reports,
he had told the prosecutors that his regression analysis showed that there was a racial disparity in
capital charging:
Q Now, you told us . . . at the beginning of your testimony, on direct examination, that
when you see things and your client wants to know, you tell your client. So did you tell
your client . . . I’ve done seven reports now, and here we are August 20, 2010. I’ve
corrected my databases. I’ve amplified my databases. I’ve had opportunity to review.
I’ve incurred over $655-thousand worth of time, and I personally, Stephan Michelson,
agree with the petitioners’ claim and the petitioners’ expert that there is statistically
significant disparity in capital felony charging based on [minority] race of defendant and
race of victim being white in Connecticut; that there is that same disparity based on
gender in capital felony charging in Connecticut, and there is that same disparity based
on geography in Connecticut? Did you tell your client that?
A Of course.
Trial Transcript at 140, In Re: Racial Disparity v. Commisioner of Correction, (Conn. Super Ct.
2012) (No. cvos-4000632) (emphasis supplied) (on file with author) [hereinafter Trial Transcript].
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anomalous finding was due to his mis-coding error of the multiple
victims’ variable.195 When his coding error was corrected, the large and
statistically significant racial disparities were clearly evident.
But the issue did not end there. In perhaps one of the most
ludicrous examples of misuse of regression in a judicial setting, the
state’s expert responded mid-trial to the revelation of his coding error
by trying a two-part ploy to wriggle out of the clear finding that
minority on white crimes were capitally charged at a substantially
higher rate than minority on minority crimes.196 First, he claimed that
because he had made a coding error in the identifier of the multiple
victim variable (which he had coded correctly in 8 previous reports), it
was now necessary to conduct in mid-trial an entirely new regression
analysis (rather than adhere to his own corrected results, which
confirmed the racial disparity that had always been present in his
earlier reports).197 Second, he then introduced a new regression which
he claimed showed no racial impact, but this was only because his
regression dropped the identifier of whether the case involved a
minority killing a white.198 In other words, dropping the key variable
195. Donohue, An Empirical Evaluation supra note 76, at 640, 657.
196. Id. at 658.
197. Id.
198. Id. Michelson also testified that with his new mid-trial revision of a capitally charging
regression he had never run a regression in which a minority on white identifier variable had been
included. In fact, he had done so as our discovery revealed. Consider the following exchanges
from the trial when Michelson introduced “Exhibit O,” which he claimed included all of the
regressions he had run after his multiple victim error in his capital charging regression (D03) had
been pointed out to him:
ATTY. GOLUB: Is this witness testifying that this document, Ex. O, contains all of the
[regressions] on charging with respect to the changes to D03. . . .
THE WITNESS: That’s exactly what I mean.
ATTY. GOLUB: Is this witness testifying under oath that this document, Ex. O, that
he’s just identified, contains all of the regressions he did in response to the error found
in D03?
THE WITNESS: Yes, that’s what I’m testifying.
Later, on cross-examination, Michelson told a different story, when we showed him the regression
he had performed but not included in Ex. O, which both included a black on white variable and
showed once again the considerable racial disparity in capital charging:
ATTY. GOLUB: The document that . . . you testified under oath contained all of your
regressions in connection with the correction to D03, that document did not include the
regression with black defendant/white victim, did it, sir?
A Apparently not.
Q When you say apparently not, why is that only apparently not? It didn’t, did it?
A Well, fine. No.
Q And you knew it didn’t, didn’t you?
A No. No, I didn’t. I thought. . . . What I said was what I thought it would be until I
actually read it.
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needed to identify racial disparity made the race effect go away in the
same way that telling a child to close her eyes makes the world
disappear. One must assume that the State’s expert resorted to such
tactics because he perceived (apparently correctly) that the trial judge
would either not be able to understand these statistical shenanigans or
would ignore them because of a desire to overlook evidence of racial
bias. Again, this is a troubling commentary on the use of statistical
evidence in legal proceedings.
Remarkably, the trial judge wrote an opinion rejecting claims of
racial disparity that entirely ignored the overwhelming evidence of
racial bias in capital charging.199 Not a single mention was made of
either my regression analysis showing the striking racial disparity in
capital charging, nor the clear evidence of racial disparity in
Michelson’s corrected capital-charging regression (let alone his
questionable efforts to disguise this clear evidence).200
2. The Connecticut Supreme Court Ends the Death Penalty
The decision in Santiago striking down the Connecticut death
penalty as unconstitutional in the wake of the legislature’s 2012
prospective abolition of capital punishment was momentous. Also
striking was the concurrence by Justices Norcott and McDonald that
assessed the “abundant . . . statistical evidence [that] strongly suggests
that racial disparities in the capital punishment regime exist in
Connecticut—as elsewhere—that cannot be accounted for by benign,
nonracial factors.” Santiago seemed to represent the final chapter in
what the concurrence called Connecticut’s “nearly 400 year struggle
with the macabre muck of capital punishment litigation.”201
After discussing numerous studies from around the country, and the
findings from my study of the Connecticut death penalty system, the
concurrence concluded, “[a] thorough and fair-minded review of the
Q Now that you’ve seen it?
A No, not now that I’ve seen it. You must have noticed the hesitation when we turned
to the last page.
Q I didn’t notice any hesitation, Dr. Michelson. I saw a person lying, but I didn’t notice
any hesitation.
Trial Transcript, supra note 194.
199. See Trial Transcript, supra note 194.
200. Indeed, even when the trial judge specifically addressed whether the Waterbury
prosecutor was more likely to capitally charge death-eligible cases, he said nothing about whether
there was evidence of racial disparity in capital charging.
201. State v. Santiago, 318 Conn. 140, 140-44, reconsideration denied, 319 Conn. 912 (2015)
(Norcott and McDonald, Js., concurring).
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available historical and sociological data thus strongly suggests that
systemic racial bias continues to infect the capital punishment system
in Connecticut in the post-Furman era.”202 This might be taken as a sign
that the strength of good empirical work will carry the day and promote
wise judicial decision-making. But some words of caution are in order
both because we have seen that some judges have struggled with
statistical evidence and can be misled by spurious claims, and because
the attachment of some to the death penalty in spite of the evidence
that has amassed about its ineffectuality, high cost, and problematic
implementation means that extraordinary efforts are sometimes
undertaken to revive it, even when it appears to have been finally killed
off. I discuss both these points below.
3. Michelson Tries to Cast Doubt on the Racial Disparity in
Charging
The 4-3 decision in State v. Santiago angered the Connecticut
prosecutors who then tried to take advantage of the retirement of one
of the members of the majority by resisting the Court’s decision.203
Perhaps trying to influence this re-hearing of the questions that had
been decided in Santiago, the State’s expert offered yet another
attempt to cast doubt on the finding of racial disparity in capital
charging in Connecticut.204 The new regression he supplied in this
endeavor provides further evidence of how meaningless results can be
generated when valid statistical protocols are ignored. Once these
meaningless results have been introduced into a policy debate,
however, they can be used by those with the type of cognitive delusion
that characterized Justice Scalia’s credulous marshalling of empirical
evidence in Baze and Glossip.205
a. Michelson drops racial identifiers and manipulates the judicial
district controls
Table 3 reproduces the new Michelson regression that he devised
after the Santiago decision to try to argue against the finding of racial

202. Id.
203. See supra note 189.
204. Stephan Michelson, Slide 50, PowerPoint Presentation at “Symposium on Race and
Arbitrariness in the Connecticut Death Penalty,” University of Conn. School of Law (Nov. 20,
2015). Michelson presented his new capital charging regressions in a forum at the University of
Conn. School of Law on November 20, 2015.
205. See supra text accompanying notes 61–62.
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disparity in capital charging.206 His table uses my sample of 205 deatheligible cases, while dropping certain variables I employed and adding
some others of his own. On its face, Michelson’s Table 3 regression finds
that minorities who kill whites (identified in the first row of the table)
are capitally charged at a rate 11 percentage points higher than all other
crimes, controlling for 11 other variables that relate to where the crime
occurred, the nature of the crime and the defendant, and whether the
defendant was represented by a public defender.207 Because the racial
effect is not statistically significant at conventional levels, Michelson
apparently hopes to persuade others that the 11 percentage point racial
disparity in capital charging seen in his Table 3 regression can be
ignored.
Instead, Michelson’s regression provides a textbook illustration of
how one can improperly manipulate regression models to ostensibly
achieve desired results that are both meaningless and misleading. The
first problem to note is that Michelson dropped the full array of racial
identifiers that both he and I had uniformly used in the many pre-trial
versions of our respective reports. In Connecticut—and indeed as
Baldus had found in Georgia, and Blume, Eisenberg, and Wells as well
as Alesino and Ferrera found for the country as a whole—the strongest
racial disparities are that minority defendants who kill whites are
treated most harshly and minority defendants who kill minority victims
least harshly.208 A regression exploring racial disparity in capital
charging that does not include the full racial breakdown of the
defendants and victims will not be able to identify such racial
disparities.
In Michelson’s last previous capital charging regression which he
introduced at trial, he had controlled for the following judicial districts:
New Haven, New Britain, and Danbury.209 One might wonder why
206. Michelson, supra note 204.
207. The second explanatory variable in Table 3 is the 1-5 egregiousness measure. The third
variable in Michelson’s regression is the third measure of egregiousness that I created, which took
advantage of the fact that the lawyers who had collected detailed information about each of the
205 death-eligible cases had checked off the presence of a list of 23 special aggravators that
included, among others, mutilation, multiple gunshot wounds, attempt to dispose of/conceal body
after death, victim killed in the presence of family members or friends, physical details of the
crime are unusually repulsive (e.g., victim drowned in own blood), and sexual assault of victim
prior to killing. This special aggravating factors variable merely tallied the number of these factors
that were present in a given case.
208. See Equal Justice and the Death Penalty, supra note 140, at 319–20; Blume, Eisenberg &
Wells, supra note 165, at 165; Alesina & Ferrara, supra note 173, at 3399.
209. This Michelson trial regression is depicted in Table 5 of Donohue, An Empirical
Evaluation, supra note 77, at 657.
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Michelson had dropped two of these three districts and added a new
one, so that in his new regression, he was only controlling for New
Haven and Hartford. The reason for the switch becomes clear in the
regression Table 4 below, which corrects Michelson’s Table 3
regressions by including the complete set of racial identifiers and then
uses his prior set of judicial district controls: had he done so he would
have shown that when minority defendants kill white victims they were
almost 20 percentage points more likely to be capitally charged. As the
highlighted box shows, this finding is highly statistically significant,
even exceeding the .01 level of significance.
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b. Controlling for all judicial districts
Michelson’s selective inclusion and omission of variables to
generate desired regression findings is a serious breach of appropriate
statistical protocol. Table 4 clearly reveals that the judicial district
controls that Michelson himself presented at trial clearly establish
racial disparity in capital charging. Since the 2012 trial, Michelson has
selectively added and subtracted judicial districts to his Table 3
regression in an apparent attempt to disguise the racial disparity. When
I simply restore the racial categories and control for all judicial districts
so there can be no claim of cherry-picking of the explanatory variables,
the statistically significant racial disparity is unmistakably present in
Table 5. This is true without any further change in Michelson’s
regression. The magnitude of the racial effect for minority on white
crimes (versus minority on minority crimes) is over 16 percentage
points with a p-value of .052.210 In other words, the racial disparity in
210. See infra Table 5. Note there are many other problems and potential difficulties with
Michelson’s Table 3 regression, including inappropriate variable selection and his use of OLS
regression rather than the more appropriate logit model, but for now the point I want to highlight
is that any dedicated search that simply combs through hundreds or even thousands of variables
without any constraining theoretical rationale in order to try to weaken a regression finding (of
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capital charging that was always evident in all ten of Michelson’s
reports (correcting for his error in the multiple victims variable), as
well as in his trial regression (when the minority on white variable is
restored) and in all of my capital charging regressions is still
unequivocally present.211

c. Adding a host of controls does not change the finding of clear
racial disparity
Everyone who works with regression analysis knows that if one can
choose among a large enough number of explanatory variables
unconstrained by any guiding theoretical principles, one can obscure
racial disparity in charging in this case) violates the basic precepts of hypothesis testing and can
only yield the type of spurious results that Michelson supplies and that Fisher so cogently warned
against. See infra note 212.
211. At times, Michelson has tried to justify excluding certain variables because they have
low t-statistics. See Donohue, An Empirical Evaluation, supra note 76, at 668. If one alters the
Table 5 regression by eliminating all variables with t-statistics less than one, the resulting racial
disparity is virtually identical and the statistical significance of the minority on white variable is
even greater.
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true statistically significant effects by selectively including or omitting
variables.212 Essentially, unprincipled (or simply misguided) variable
selection can generate random perturbations in a particular coefficient
estimate and if one just selects the variables in a way to always choose
the random perturbation that cuts in a particular direction, one can
reduce a true effect to statistical insignificance.
In his widely cited paper, “Multiple Regression in Legal
Proceedings,” the former MIT econometrician Frank Fisher addressed
this problem and explained that one should specify one’s model in
advance of looking at the data based on firm theoretical grounds for
variable selection: Adding and deleting variables “by first looking at
the data and then including those factors that appear correlated with
the dependent variable is a recipe for spurious results.”213 Michelson’s
cherry-picked Table 3 regression falls into this category and should
serve as a cautionary tale.
In my thirty years as an empirical researcher, I have seen few social
scientific relationships as strongly robust as the racial disparity in
capital charging in Connecticut. Indeed, Table 6 shows, as I testified at
trial, that one can add a string of theoretically justified control
variables—identifying whether the defendant or victim was female,
whether the defendant had prior prison sentences or was a stranger to
the victim, and controlling for multiple measures of the strength of the
evidence—and the core conclusion remains unchanged and highly
statistically significant. Table 6 shows that Connecticut prosecutors
capitally charged minorities who killed white victims at a rate that is 20
percentage points higher than the rate that they charged minorities
who killed minorities.214

212. See Franklin M. Fisher, Multiple Regression in Legal Proceedings, 80 COLUM. L. REV.
702, 713–14 (1980).
213. Id.
214. As Andrew Gelman observes, the pernicious tactic of inserting variables into regressions
to obscure true effects has been employed for decades: “The statistician George L. Saiger from
Columbia University received [Council for Tobacco Research] Special Project funds ‘to seek to
reduce the correlation of smoking and diseases by introduction of additional variables’; he also
was paid $10,873 in 1966 to testify before Congress, denying the cigarette-cancer link.” Andrew
Gelman, Statistics for Cigarette Sellers, CHANCE, Vol. 25.3, 43, 45 (2012)
http://www.stat.columbia.edu/~gelman/research/published/ChanceEthics4.pdf.
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CONCLUSION
If the Atkins standard for assessing the constitutionality of the
death penalty is to be maintained, empirical evaluation will be at the
heart of the case, as Justice Breyer’s opinion in Glossip adumbrates. In
a perfect world, one would like judges to have enough quantitative heft
to be able to evaluate the quality of statistical studies, but that is clearly
an unrealistic goal. The skills needed to fully assess empirical studies
are far beyond the capacity of most judges, as well as most legislators
and policymakers. Moreover, to fully evaluate one of these statistical
studies, one would need to have a very detailed knowledge of the data
used and the intricacies of statistical modelling of criminal justice
processes, which is a tall order for anyone but academics and policy
analysts with sophisticated empirical training.
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However, there are a number of practices that can aid judges and
policymakers in evaluating statistical studies. At times, one might hope
to glean some indication of reliability by assessing the quality of the
academic journal in which a study appears and the education, training,
reputation, and institutional affiliation of the study authors.
Infrequently, meta-analyses by top experts such as the NRC report on
deterrence and the death penalty can provide further guidance.
Because the NRC critique was so overwhelmingly negative on the two
statistical studies that Justice Scalia relied upon, I think the role of the
academic is to offer a strong rebuke of his conduct in this matter.
Especially on a matter of life and death, one would hope for more from
a Supreme Court Justice than citations to studies discredited by a
unanimous NRC panel and to a paper whose lead author has published
a specific refutation of Justice Scalia’s prior conclusion based thereon.
Justice Scalia is not alone in going astray in the domain of
econometric evidence concerning capital punishment. We saw that the
trial judge in McCleskey misappraised the value of the Baldus study
showing of racial disparity in capital outcomes in Georgia, as did the
trial judge evaluating the evidence of racial disparity in capital
outcomes in Connecticut. Although both studies fared better at the
appellate level, the dissenting justices in Santiago still made claims that
were directly contradicted by the best empirical evidence.215
Justice Scalia ended his opinion in Glossip with a rousing statement
that because Justice Breyer advanced the view that the death penalty
is unconstitutional, he “does not just reject the death penalty, he rejects
the Enlightenment.” It is a lovely phrase but exactly the type of
“specious reasoning and seductive eloquence” that Beccaria hoped to
215. The dissenting opinion by Chief Justice Chase Rogers is a case in point. Rogers criticized
the claim that the declining use of the death penalty was a factor undermining its constitutional
validity by asserting that the “declining imposition of capital punishment may indicate that the
death penalty is being employed precisely as was intended, to punish only the very worst of
society’s criminals . . . “But this speculation is directly contradicted by the empirical evidence on
exactly this point, as Justice Breyer noted in his Glossip dissent: the Connecticut death penalty
did not limit its application to the worst of the worst offenders over the study period from 19732007. This finding was true regardless of which of the three different egregiousness scales that I
employed or whether one employed the egregiousness scale developed by the State’s expert.
Similarly, the Chief Justice’s efforts to discern a deterrent value in executing death row
inmates after the death penalty had been abolished prospectively by the Connecticut legislature
stands on an even weaker foundation than Justice Scalia’s mythical deterrence claims. Again, the
National Research Council report of 2012 finding no credible evidence of deterrence in even
active executing states applies a fortiori to any deterrence claims asserted when no future criminal
act could be punished by death in Connecticut. Again, the critical Atkins language should be
invoked: executing convicts after prospective abolition cannot be deemed to “measurably
contribute” to deterrence.
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eliminate from discussions of criminal justice.216 The Enlightenment
was characterized by advances in science and the rejection of the
influence of tradition, prejudice, superstition, and myth. By his careful
recitation of the empirical literature on the operation of the death
penalty, Justice Breyer, like Justices Norcott and McDonald in the
Santiago case, captured the best of the Enlightenment spirit of using
human reason to understand the operation of an important American
institution and illuminate its infirmities. Any judge who succeeds in
properly evaluating the empirical evidence on capital punishment will
find it difficult to sustain the validity of capital punishment under the
Atkins standard that the death penalty is unconstitutional unless it
“measurably contributes” to one or both of the goals of deterrence and
retribution. The empirical evidence buttresses the view that capital
punishment “is nothing more than the purposeless and needless
imposition of pain and suffering.”217

216. See supra text accompanying note 16.
217. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 318–19 (2002).

